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FOREWORD
In 2007 two international symposia of a great significance to HEUNI took place: one was held on 22-23 January in
Helsinki to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the establishement of the Institute on 23 December 1981. The other
was the second Stockholm Criminology Symposium on 4-6 June where HEUNI, again in celebration of its 25th
Anniversary, took a major role in organising many workshops comprising about 50 speakers.
The present HEUNI Paper contains contributions from these events, most of them deriving from the Helsinki
Symposium while the two last ones were held in Stockholm. The papers from both events deal with issues that a
close to HEUNI’s current working profile and to UN priorities, such as organised crime, prisons in Eastern Europe,
technical assistance, crime prevention, and UN Standards and Norms related to Crime and Criminal Justice.
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Kuniko Ozaki, Director,
Division for Treaty Affairs/UNODC
It is my pleasure to represent the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime at this international symposium
marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control,
affiliated with the United Nations. Congratulations and
best wishes from the head of UNODC, Antonio Maria
Costa, on your silver jubilee. He was not able to
participate in this meeting, but I am happy to represent
the Office at this event, especially in my capacity as a
member of HEUNI’s International Advisory Board.
Since 1981 – when HEUNI was established by
an agreement between Finland and the United Nations
– the Institute has worked closely with the UN,
enriching its work on crime prevention and criminal
justice. This symposium is the latest example.
I would like to say a few words on the topic of
this meeting, namely technical assistance in crime
prevention and criminal justice.
The magnitude of global challenges relating to
drugs, crime and terrorism is prompting States to seek
greater use of multilateral partnerships. In the past five
years, UN-brokered conventions against corruption and
trans-national organized crime have come into force.
Now UNODC is the custodian of five international
conventions and three protocols on drugs, crime and
corruption, as well as a number of international
standards and norms on drugs, crime prevention and
criminal justice. Furthermore, the Office has a key role
in the UN’s action to prevent and counter terrorism.
The key to the effectiveness of these legal
instruments is their implementation. An important aspect
is peer review, for example through the two
Conferences of State Parties that have been set up in
order to promote and review the implementation of the
Conventions on organized crime and corruption.
Another forum for peer review is the Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. One of the
main issues of the 2007 session is to be crime prevention
and criminal justice responses to urban crime, including
gang-related activities. This is an issue that deserves
serious attention before crime turns major cities into
failing cities. I urge HEUNI and other institutes of the
UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme
Network to actively contribute to finding appropriate
responses to this serious challenge.
The Network – which presently consists of 15
institutions around the world – has an important role to
play in helping states turn their good intentions into
practice. We need more information on “best
practices”, more training of national experts, and more
information on crime trends. Over the past quarter
century, HEUNI has built up a reputation in these areas.
Your expertise and support are vital, and your input –
for example at Crime Commissions and Congresses –
is appreciated.
For its part, UNODC certainly has a key role to
play in providing technical assistance in the field of
criminal justice. We provide legal advice to help states
ratify relevant international instruments and we help
them draft or revise their legal codes and structures in
order to enable them to apply these instruments
domestically. We do this through regional meetings of
technical experts, or one on one at the national level.
We have prepared model legislation, for example
a Model Treaty on Extradition or a Model Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. We help States
to strengthen their anti-corruption and anti-money
laundering measures, or to improve juvenile justice, or
prison reform. We train criminal justice practitioners
to ensure that they are better equipped to provide
restorative justice, protect victims, or to run drug
Applied Knowledge: Technical Assistance to
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treatment courts. And we encourage regional and
international cooperation to fight trans-national threats.
Every State has its own unique challenges. Before
providing assistance, you need to know what is needed.
UNODC – together with the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe – has therefore produced a
Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit. This should be a
big help to practitioners in the field assessing policing,
access to justice, and custodial and non-custodial
measures.
Indeed, UNODC experts have carried out such
assessments in countries as diverse as Afghanistan,
Haiti and Liberia.
While every case is different, solutions should be
based on common international standards and norms.
That is why UNODC has recently published a
compendium of United Nations standards and norms
in crime prevention and criminal justice – the first time
such a book has been published since 1992. I know
that this is a subject close to your hearts and we can
certainly make copies available to you.
Your work is vital in helping us and Member States
to implement these norms and standards. You play a
key role in analyzing how states are living up to these
standards. The Institute’s analysis of questionnaires and
surveys contribute to an evidence based approach to
crime prevention.
Still, as Mr. Costa likes to say, when it comes to
measuring international crime trends, we are flying
through a statistical fog. There is almost no data
available on crime: is it increasing or not? What
comparisons can be made among countries? What
forms of crime are greater threats than others, and
why? We need a better methodology for measuring
crime and we need more data. A working group of the
TOC Conference of the Parties has now taken up this
issue.
HEUNI is a recognized leader in the field of crime
analysis and, together with other Institutes in the
Network, can help fill in blanks in the knowledge of
the international community. You are in the unique
position of being able to apply independent expert advice
on methodology and analysis for improving the world’s
ability to, for example, track the extent of human
trafficking, or measure corruption. We need your
analytical brains to help us have a better understanding
of these contemporary challenges. Your years of
experience can help States deal with issues that are a
relatively new domain for international relations.
In closing, I would again like to congratulate
HEUNI on its 25th birthday and we look forward to
close cooperation in the next quarter century.
10
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Gloria Laycock, Director
University College London,
Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, UK
This is a highly personal view based upon my
knowledge of HEUNI over some time but also a more
intimate picture over the past almost five years that I
have been privileged to be on the HEUNI Board.
I have divided my short talk into four sections:
1. What HEUNI does well
2. What HEUNI does not do so well
3. Why not?
4. What may be needed for the future?
What HEUNI does well
We are celebrating the 25th birthday of HEUNI so we
can certainly conclude that one of the things it does
well is survive! This is not a trivial achievement in what
is essentially a hostile environment for crime prevention
research and development.
HEUNI also maintains a high profile not only
across the European Union but on a wider scale. It
has generated a substantial research agenda over many
years and is the only source of comparative information
on the criminal justice systems of a wide range of
countries.
HEUNI staff are also very visible at conferences,
meetings, symposia and a variety of congresses across
the world. They make a valuable contribution to the
discussions, to the development of ideas and to the
dissemination of research.
What HEUNI does not do so well
For very understandable reasons, the generosity of the
Finnish and Swedish Governments in supporting
HEUNI is limited, and if HEUNI is to broaden its
agenda and increase its capacity then further resources
need to be found. There is, unfortunately, something of
a vicious circle here – finding the time to bid for money
without the staff to do so means that the pool of staff
stays small. There is no spare capacity for the additional
investment that is required. This is a problem by no
means unique to HEUNI – it is common throughout
the research community. Partly because of this funding
regime HEUNI is heavily dependent upon the ad hoc
opportunities that arise to carry out research or to
contribute to the development of crime prevention
policy. A consequence of this is that it is difficult for
staff to pursue their own research ideas or to further
develop work that has already been commissioned.
One of my constant comments is the time it takes
to complete projects. They sometimes seem to sit on
the HEUNI agenda for many years before a final
publication materialises. I make a point of saying that
this is not a criticism because it seems to me that there
is often little that the staff of HEUNI can do to solve
the problem. They are heavily dependent upon the
provision of information from other jurisdictions and
although we all claim an interest in the work of
colleagues elsewhere, and of hearing about good
practice, we are not quite so keen on providing
information in a timely fashion.
Why not?
I feel that one of the major difficulties faced by HEUNI
is a lack of a secure financial base; as an organisation
it is heavily dependent upon a single source of funds
from the Finnish Government. Over the past 25 years
this funding source has continued but it may not do so
forever. It would be wise if HEUNI were to try to
Speaking Note for HEUNI 25TH Birthday Event
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diversify its funding across a wider range of
organisations, ideally seeking ‘core’ funds rather than
project-specific money linked closely to the production
of a particular piece of work. This would free up staff
time to bid for research money as it becomes available
or to pursue a greater range of self-initiated research.
What may be needed for the future?
The strategic direction of HEUNI over the coming years
needs to be specifically considered. Should the aim be
to expand or maintain a steady state? What are the
implications for HEUNI of the enlarged EU? What
about the emergence of the Russian Federation – are
there any additional implications or opportunities
presented by these developments? Would it make sense
for HEUNI to attempt a fund raising exercise across
some of the key members of the EU, seeking a small
amount of core funds from each which, in aggregation,
might make a significant difference to the work of the
Institute? These are challenging questions but after 25
successful years perhaps the time is right to address
them.
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HEUNI
Károly Bárd, Professor
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Let me take a historical perspective and start with the
thesis: the profile of any organization is shaped to a
large extent by the personality of the head of that
organization. The impact of the director’s personality
is even stronger if the organization is small and
operating with limited staff and resources as it is the
case with HEUNI. And in fact the profile, the
perception and self-perception of the Institute was to
a significant extent determined by the skills and the
preferences of its directors.
It started with Inkeri Anttila, an emblematic figure
in criminology, a proponent of a sober criminal policy
and neo-classicism, a representative of “European”
criminal law. By the latter I mean criminal law and
criminal policy that find their origins in the ideas of the
Enlightenment, in rationalism and also romanticism in
its positive formulation in that it accepts diversity and
the uniqueness of each individual as long as this does
not jeopardize commonly accepted moral values. The
criminal law envisaged by Inkeri is humane in that it
tries to avoid the infliction of unreasonable and
unnecessary pain, and it is rational in that it is aware of
its inherent limitations. During Inkeri’s reign HEUNI
became a European criminal policy center elaborating
with the involvement of the most outstanding experts
of the region the standards of a humane and rational
criminal justice system.
Then became Matti Joutsen, a key figure of the
entire UN network, a skillful negotiator and master in
drafting international treaties and other types of
documents. Under his directorship HEUNI became one
of the most influential actors at the UN Congresses
and in all UN bodies responsible for the preparation or
the implementation of the Congress resolutions.
The current director Kauko Aromaa is one of the
most outstanding representatives of applied, practice
oriented criminology. At present HEUNI is an Institute
running or leading projects of innovative nature
attractive also for political decision-makers. These are
projects that help us explain and give solutions to
problems which affect our every day life, be it product
safety, transnational organized crime, or the unbiased,
impartial functioning of the administration of justice-
all related to the operation of a market economy.
But the directors’ personality, even in the case of
such a small institution as HEUNI, is but one of the
determinants. Also “external” factors have significantly
shaped the Institute’s profile. During the “cold war”
HEUNI offered a forum for dialogue between East
and West. The location of the institute was perfect not
simply geographically but also due that the welfare
values much more preferred by the Nordic countries
than in the rest of the Western world were not that
distant from the values, like solidarity or equality, the
socialist countries proclaimed but never respected in
practice. Thus HEUNI was to serve as a mediator
between West and East and the working methods were
designed in line with the mission: the Institute brought
people together, the conferences and seminars were
all-European events. There was little room for bilateral
cooperation, the two parts of Europe were seen as
blocks. Thus the appropriate forum was the all-
European seminar; in fact the 80’s was marked by the
great conferences attended by a huge number of people
addressing the most burning challenges the criminal
justice systems of the continent were faced with: how
to design a rational, humane and at the same time
effective and simple criminal justice system which pays
due attention to the interests of victims without
jeopardizing the due process rights of defendants –to
mention but one of those challenges. HEUNI at that
time operated as a kind of European institute for
comparative criminal justice. It provided a forum to
everyone to present his/her country’s preferences and
we learned a lot. But in spite of its openness to all
kinds of ideas HEUNI also transmitted the values of
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Nordic criminal policy which I must admit are close to
my heart.
We Eastern Europeans who happened to be born
in the less fortunate part of the region were particularly
grateful to HEUNI for bringing us together with our
colleagues from the other part of Europe. Let us be
honest: in the old days scholars from our region were
seen as second class experts. True colleagues from
the “West” politely reassured us all the time that that
they learned much from the encounters with us but
apart from a few “Ostrechtler” who came to visit the
ex-communist countries, not for gaining intellectual
impetus but rather to collect empirical material for their
research it was rather the Eastern Europeans who were
eager to get scholarships at institutions in Western
Europe, it was us who were searching for opportunities
to visit libraries in the richer part of the continent. And
HEUNI helped us a lot through the short term
internships, offering consultancy work and through
bringing us together with the most outstanding scholars
from the “West”.
And I am wondering whether the rationales for
HEUNI’s establishment in 1982 are non-existent
anymore ? Has the mission the Institute has
accomplished in the first decade following its setting
up become obsolete ? I am afraid not, this mission still
has its justification. It is not the entire Eastern block
anymore that is in need of massive intellectual support
but there are still states in Europe, which are outside
the main stream. These are the countries that have
very slight chances to become members of the
European Union in the decades to come. And as to the
Nordic values I am afraid that perhaps there is even
more need to keep them alive today than it was the
case at the time of HEUNI’s creation.
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Ideas on How a Regional Institute Like HEUNI Could Best Promote
Knowledge-Based Criminal Policy and What the Role of Member
States Coud Be
Pirkko Lahti,
Member of HEUNI’s International Advisory Board,
Helsinki, Finland
The Role of HEUNI
HEUNI is a fact-oriented institute. It is collecting
information and reporting results. It is a well valued
institute both in Finland and in Europe. It is known all
over the world in the area of criminal policy and
criminology. HEUNI is suprisingly effective althrough
its staff and resources are not very big.
When some institute is fact- or knowledge-
oriented, it is taking responsibily only of that information
or knowledge, what it is offering. This is the typical
way how an institute producing sectorized knowledge
acts. It is the rule to keep to the information, that is
collected and not to go further in the interpretations.
The very much interesting question is, who is using the
information we are getting from different institutes. Who
has the whole picture? I belive, in many cases it is the
amateur- politician, who is trying to put together all of
the given information. Right or wrong?
Because the society is moving towards a fact
oriented world, the basic question everywhere is, what
kind information is needed. I take an example from
crime prevention: it is not enough to know crimes,
figures, types etc. but crime prevention is something
much broader including eg. living, housing, work
situation, money etc. Who is giving information of those
issues and who can bind this information to crime?
How to influence
What is influence: is it lots of publicity, lots of publications
or is it possibilities to change laws or thinking?
The effectiveness is often measured by figures,
so and so many books, speeches, references in media.
These are some kind of measurements, but it is not
really telling about the effectiveness. It is easy to show
that people are reading papers or listening to speeches,
but these do not influence their behaviour or thinking.
There is a big need to find measurements of the
effectiveness and influencing. These measurements
should be discussed broadly and ways should be found
how to follow what is happening if e.g. some publications
with discussions in media have had any influense.
HEUNI 25 years
It is time to go back to the basics and ask what kind of
knowledge is needed e.g. for crime prevention. Then
we should look through HEUNI’s work programme
and see what part of the needed information is available
from HEUNI, what are the longrunning programmes
and the need for acute programs.
There is a big need to write HEUNI’s strategical
programme with vision and goals. What should HEUNI
be in year 2010, its role at European / world level etc.
It should also include ideas for budgeting old and new
programs. The role of the Advisory Board, as well as
its composition should be part of the strategical thinking.
This clear picture of the Institute should help HEUNI
make decisions regarding the programmes and projects
as well the yearly running educational work.
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Radim Bureš, Deputy Director,
Crime Prevention Department,
Ministry of Interior, Prag, Czech Republic
1. Technical assistance can work
We can take an example of the Czech Republic.
Technical assistance in developing
crime prevention methods
The Czech Republic started its crime prevention
programme in 1996. In 1997 we launched a technical
assistance project with the United Kingdom under
Know-How-Fund. The objective of the project was
British assistance to the Czech Ministry of Interior and
Czech Police in developing methods for preventive
work already applied by the British police. During the
project UK specialists visited several times the Czech
Republic for fact-finding missions and for trainings. UK
has been visited twice by the Czech delegation. The
first high level Czech delegation led by the Deputy
Minister visited the Home Office and the Crime
Prevention College in Easingwold to learn about
strategic issues - the system and management of crime
prevention. The second delegation was composed of
police specialists and its program was focused on
acquiring concrete methods immediately applicable at
police work. The project was complemented by the
supply of literature. This project helped to establish the
crime prevention approach within the police and the
whole country and helped to start preventive projects
and activities. The advantage of the project was its
wide scope covering both policy making and supporting
new initiatives on the local level. It is also worthwhile
to add that the results of the project were not visible
immediately and it started to fully show the results only
two or three years later.
Important lesson to be learned:
Governmental policy and local initiatives are two
inseparable sides of effective crime prevention.
Effective technical assistance project should cover both
of these sides.
Technical assistance in criminal justice
reforms
In 1997 and 1999 a high level Czech delegation was
invited to the USA under a State Department grant
managed by Florida State University School of
Criminology. The aim of the visit was to study the
criminal justice system in the US and see examples of
progressive methods of policing in several US cities.
The Czech delegation was composed inter alia of the
Deputy Minister of Interior, the Police President, the
Attorney General and a Supreme Court Justice. Almost
all of the participants played in their further career an
outstanding role in policing and the criminal justice
apparatus in the Czech Republic. An independent
evaluation would have hardly found any concrete impact
of the project in a short term after its termination. In a
longer perspective an insider could detect a number of
important developments which can be assigned to the
ideas acquired through the project. Some ideas
appeared in a new penal code and a code of penal
procedures, namely strengthening the criminal process
during the trial and proofing before the court. Police
had fundamentally opened itself to the public and started
to inform the public about itself and about the local
crime situation. Some new ideas like the Centre for
early intervention for juvenile delinquents were
developed. On the other hand community policing
methods only gradually started to be supported in the
country and the development of this method was much
slower than one might have expected. It might be
concluded that one of the reasons of slower
Technical Assistance in Traditional Areas
of Crime Prevention
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implementation of community policing is that nobody
from grass root level who may have started local
initiatives was involved in the project.
Important lessons to be learned:
Careful selection of the target group is essential for
the further impact of the project. It means not only to
select leaders or potential leaders who can exert
influence or decide on reforms and changes. Especially
in the area of traditional crime prevention including
community policing some of those responsible for
implementing of projects at the local level should be
included in the target group.
Second lesson: technical assistance projects in
crime prevention and related areas hardly bring visible
results in short time. Any evaluation should keep this
time lag in mind.
Technical assistance in prevention of
human trafficking
Finally between 2001 and 2004 a rather extensive
project focusing on developing and enhancing country
response to human trafficking has been implemented
in the Czech Republic. The project was prepared and
financed by the UNODC. Also this project covered a
a whole range of activities starting from drafting the
national strategy through research up to setting of
referral mechanism and supporting work of local
NGO´s. Providing financial support was not the most
important part of the project. The most important part
of the project was that it provided an independent
platform for partnership of civil servants, police and
NGO´s. There was also a long time gap between signing
the contract and starting the supported activities due
to the delay of payment clearance. During this period
project partners met regularly and started working
together. When the project activities finally officially
started, a number of goals had been already achieved.
This project helped to establish the governmental policy
towards human trafficking including prevention and
assistance to victims.
Important lesson to be learned:
Financial support need not to be the most important
part of the project. It may be targeted to fill clear
identified gaps. Developing of the broad supporting
coalitions seems to be an important factor enhancing
achieving project objectives. Preparatory phases based
on close discussion between recipient and donor are
also very important for the success of the project.
All these three examples show that technical
assistance in the area of traditional crime prevention is
possible and can be effective.
(The author would like to use this opportunity to
acknowledge leaders of above mentioned projects:
Jack Acton from the U.K., Anthony Pate from the
USA and Kristiina Kangaspunta from the UNODC)
2. Difficulties in implementation of
technical assistance in traditional areas
of crime prevention
When saying that technical assistance can be effective
we must also pay attention to the number of difficulties
and obstacles we meet when implementing projects in
traditional crime prevention.
Selecting and determining target groups
On the contrary to many (if not all) other areas of
criminal justice there are two very different target
groups for technical assistance.
First there are state administration bodies
responsible for policy making and setting up necessary
infrastructure for crime prevention. Governmental
officials, decisions makers and senior police
commanders are those who fall within this group. This
is the right target group for instructing about the role of
different agents in crime prevention, about partnership,
need of research, need of co-ordination bodies, need
of financial support and its sustainability. They can be
informed about the importance of the preventive
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approach to crime, they can set objectives and targets,
and they can establish both implementation and co-
ordination structures. They decide on the way of
financial supporting of crime prevention activities.
This target group is also preferable from the donor
side in project developing. Members of this group are
easily identifiable and approachable, they speak foreign
languages, often they are able or used to work easily
in international environment.
However, they may have limited powers and
abilities to initiate locally based projects. The experience
of the Czech Republic before 1996 shows the situation
when the National Council had been established, policy
documents had been drawn but on the local level almost
nothing happened.
Rather different is the other group of those
implementing local projects. These are local people,
elected representatives of local self-government, local
administration civil servants, social services staff or
local NGOs, who have knowledge and enthusiasm to
start crime prevention project but may not have enough
knowledge of appropriate methods. This group is much
less preferable as a target group for a project. Its
members are difficult to identify and to select from
hundreds of different municipalities. They do not speak
foreign languages, the international environment is not
familiar to them, they may not be customised to the
level of generality used in trainings, and they may
require basic detailed information about the
implementation of different crime prevention methods.
But when this group of people is carefully selected for
the project they may become necessary sparking
elements at the local level that can spread preventive
know-how in the country in a snow ball effect.
Profound knowledge of the recipient
country
The quality of the advice or training and its impact
depends a lot on tradition and structure of state
administration in the recipient country. In a number of
countries there are strict differences between state
administration and local self-government. It was also
the case in the Czech Republic until the year 2000.
State administration works on strict rules and clear
chain of command. One can expect more or less fast
implementation of instructions but can not expect too
much initiative. However, community based crime
prevention heavily depends on local initiative. Locally
elected councils are much more sensitive to security
needs of citizens and they are also much more aware
the local security situation and its problems. Often local
self-governments are not very responsive to
government initiatives and instruction.
Technical assistance in crime prevention should
take into account this specific position of two major
players in crime prevention - government and local self-
government – and try to find approaches satisfying both.
Part of the deal should be the issue of financing crime
prevention projects when the external sources would
dry up.
Recipient of donor driven technical
assistance
All discourses about technical assistance speak about
the necessity of technical assistance being driven by
the recipient. The task is not so simple. In a number of
cases the demand is not articulated well enough. The
situation can be easier in more technical areas of
technical assistance, say in waste management. In
societal changes and the whole area of responding to
crime the situation is much more difficult. Senior
officials may not be aware of the need of adopting
crime prevention measures.
Part of the project may be focused on developing
understanding the recipient’s own needs. It should be
acknowledged that such a long preparatory phase may
not fit to the strict donor time table.
Important tools to “developing needs” are the UN
standards and norms and CCPCJ and ECOSOC
resolutions. These documents create visions of what
should be done in different areas of crime prevention
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and criminal justice. In the area of traditional crime
prevention there are two leading documents:
“Guidelines for co-operation and technical assistance
in the field of urban crime prevention, adopted by
ECOSOC Resolution 9/1995 and “Guidelines for the
prevention of crime” adopted by the ECOSOC as
Resolution 13/2002. These two documents together with
the instrument of collecting information on
implementation of the latter set the necessary and fully
valid framework in which the technical assistance in
traditional crime prevention can be developed.
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Jaakko Christensen, Senior Detective Superintendet,
NBI, Vantaa, Finland
The importance of criminal intelligence work has
become ever more evident as crime, especially
organised crime and terrorist groups, is increasingly
professional, international and versatile in nature e.g.
through the criminal use of ICT and through an
increased freedom of movement - also for criminals.
Furthermore, the ever changing modus operandi and
the threat of counter measures that organised and other
serious crime groups develop as a response to law
enforcement efforts should not be underestimated and
is a further reason for developing the intelligence
gathering and assessment capacities of law
enforcement authorities.
Criminal intelligence cooperation is especially
important in the international context. In a global society
criminal elements have few boundaries, both in the
visible and in the virtual environment, unlike those
limiting law enforcement cooperation such as legal,
geographic and language barriers as well as a
formalistic method for cooperation and exchange of
information.
Criminal intelligence is an important ingredient in
the correct allocation and use of resources. A well
functioning and real-time information gathering process,
accurate analysis and valid threat assessments are
pivotal to the strategic decision making process of law
enforcement authorities.
Intelligence led policing - and more widely
intelligence led law enforcement (ILLE) - is a
comprehensive concept for a structured information
process in modern law enforcement. As such, the
concept of using intelligence for decision making is not
a novelty. However, formalising intelligence gathering
and analyses for operational and strategic decision
making is. A few examples that have been in the
forefront of this development are the “Compstat” model
developed by the NYPD in the mid-90s and the
“National Criminal Intelligence Model” of the UK.
Building upon these ideas the European Union has also
launched the European Criminal Intelligence Model –
ECIM which can and has been applied also on a more
regional level e.g. the Baltic Sea Region.
The Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic
Sea Region was set up by the Heads of Government
of the Baltic Sea States in 1996 at the first summit held
in Visby, Sweden due to an “urgent need for direct
and concerted action to combat organised crime”.
The Task Force plans and carries out co-operation
between its members with support of its most active
partners Interpol, Europol and the World Customs
Organisation in fulfilling the mandate of preventing and
combating organised crime by improving and enhancing
the exchange of information, initiating and implementing
concrete operations and co-operation in judicial matters
as well as in training and research.
The Task Force, which consists of the Personal
Representatives of the Heads of Government, is the
supreme political steering body, which meets twice
annually to evaluate work under its auspices and
especially of the Operative Committee (OPC) which
is responsible for coordinating law enforcement co-
operation. The OPC which consists of representatives
from the police, customs, border guard and prosecution
authorities meets every two to three months. It
proposes joint measures, carries responsibility for the
implementation of operations and serves as a
multidisciplinary expert body in operational matters.
With the experiences of the Task Force in mind, the
writer proposes two subjects for which technical
assistance should be considered:
Developing Intelligence Led Law Enforcement
– an Example from the Baltic Sea Region
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1. Project based, target oriented
multidisciplinary law enforcement co-
operation
Best practice examples of police, customs
and border guard co-operation, such as the
Finnish Police-Customs-Border Guard Joint
Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Centre(s)
on a national level and the Baltic Sea Task
Force on a regional level, could be exploited
and presented as models for further
development.
2. Criminal intelligence process or
“intelligence cycle” as an ingredient of
ILLE
Technical assistance in developing a law
enforcement concept and structure which
will repeatedly and in a consistent manner
process information using the concept of
intelligence led law enforcement for better
decision making could be an area of technical
assistance for which there is undoubtedly “a
market” but also one for which few deliver
technical assistance on an international level.
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Roy Walmsley, Associate of the International Centre
for Prison Studies, King’s College,
London, UK
It is an honour to have been asked to participate in this
symposium, which celebrates 25 years of HEUNI’s
work. I am a great admirer of the role that HEUNI
has played in drawing attention to crime prevention
and control issues especially in central and eastern
Europe. For much of these 25 years the situation in
central and eastern Europe in respect of crime and
criminal justice has not been well known in the rest of
this continent and beyond, but HEUNI’s vision and
persistence and the initiatives it has taken have ensured
that much has been done to fill that gap in knowledge.
And increased knowledge has created the opportunities
for technical assistance in some of the areas of need.
My collaboration with HEUNI has focused
principally on developments in the prison systems of
central and eastern Europe. Initially I looked at the
situation in 1994, soon after the historic political changes
in the region in the period 1989-91, and I then revisited
the same issues seven years later in 2001. In this short
contribution this morning I will draw attention to some
of the main areas of continuing concern in the
development of these prison systems, the areas in which
technical assistance is most required.
But first I want to make an important point. As
we all know, in the 15 or so years since the political
changes there has been enormous progress in almost
all these countries. Their adherence to democratic
values and the rule of law has been recognised by their
acceptance as members of the Council of Europe and
their economic and political development by the
admission already of about half the countries into the
European Union. Unsurprisingly, such progress has
similarly been seen in the management and treatment
of prisoners. Although there are many areas where
further progress is needed, this is not something that
distinguishes these countries from the rest of Europe.
The problems faced today by the prison systems in the
Czech Republic, in Hungary and in Poland for example
are mirrored in problems in France, Italy, Spain and
Britain. The situation at the eastern end of Europe,
especially in some of the countries of the former Soviet
Union and one or two others, is different in degree, but
increasingly this is a problem more of resources than
of objectives and attitudes.
I will say a few words about seven areas of continuing
concern:
• the numbers held in the prisons;
• the conditions of pre-trial detention;
• the limited resources available;
• the shortage of non-custodial alternatives
to imprisonment;
• staff recruitment and retention, and staff
training;
• the constructive use of prisoners’ time; and
• health care in the prisons.
The numbers held in the prisons
Prison populations in central and eastern Europe are
generally higher than in the rest of Europe, though they
are no higher in the countries of the former Yugoslavia
and Albania. Many prisons are crowded and therefore
are faced with all the problems that this causes.
Nevertheless several countries of the region have been
successful in bringing down their numbers, including
Armenia, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine. In almost all of these,
however, prison populations remain well above the
levels in the rest of Europe and the Russian figures
have been climbing again in the last two years. Other
countries too are keen to reduce their numbers and
can benefit from lessons learned by those that have
Prison Systems in Central and Eastern Europe:
Some Areas of Continuing Concern
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been successful in doing so and by comparing their
practice with those of other countries with much lower
rates.
The conditions of pre-trial detention
The conditions of pre-trial detention are frequently
inadequate. The Council of Europe’s Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (the CPT) regularly draws
attention to insufficient space in such facilities, and in
general too many people are placed in pre-trial
detention, they stay there too long and the regime they
experience there is very limited. The international
standards emphasise that pre-trial detention should be
used sparingly, for as short a time as possible and that
detainees should have a constructive regime, but sadly
this often does not happen. A new 2006 Council of
Europe Recommendation gives further guidance on
what is required, reflecting the fact that pre-trial
detainees must be regarded as innocent until they are
proved guilty and must be treated in such a way as
reflects that status. In most countries of central and
eastern Europe they are only allowed out of their cells
for an hour a day whereas the CPT recommends that
they should be allowed to spend at least eight hours
outside their cells engaged in purposeful activities of a
varied kind. Ways of reducing the use and length of
pre-trial detention and improving the conditions are now
well-known and advice and assistance are available
from countries that have already succeeded in making
such changes.
The limited resources available
I don’t suppose there is a prison administration in
Europe that feels that its government provides it with
sufficient resources for the task it is required to carry
out. Nevertheless resources are particularly inadequate
in some countries of the former Soviet Union and one
or two others also. Prison systems are in serious
difficulties when they cannot easily pay staff salaries,
feed prisoners a sufficient and balanced diet and
guarantee a good standard of health care. But when
economic conditions in a country are extremely
unfavourable it is not easy to persuade the government
to devote extra resources to ensuring that the prisons
are being properly managed. However, that is the
responsibility that they have. The CPT puts much
pressure on governments to improve practice by
emphasising specific deficiencies in their reports. Each
has signed up to the European Convention on the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment and so is publicly accountable
for any failure to respond to CPT recommendations in
respect of the improvement of standards.
The shortage of non-custodial
alternatives to imprisonment
One of the traditional reasons for comparatively high
levels of imprisonment in central and eastern Europe
was the shortage of non-custodial alternatives available
to sentencers. This is an area in which there has been
much activity in recent years. Provision for offenders
to be supervised in the community is now increasing,
and also for the introduction of community service. But
there is a long way to go before such measures are
available throughout central and eastern Europe, are
accepted by courts as measures that actually do enable
them to reduce the number of prison sentences imposed,
and are carried out with the expertise that has been
acquired in some European countries. Supervision in
the community (probation or whatever individual
countries choose to call it) is not a cheap option, although
it is less costly than imprisonment, and community
service requires good administrative support. Such
measures are much needed and have the potential to
contribute to significant reductions in the levels of
imprisonment and overcrowding.
Staff recruitment and retention, and staff
training
Prison administrations generally do not find staff
recruitment difficult, except in the case of specialist
staff responsible for treatment and for health care, and
in cities with low unemployment levels. However,
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retaining staff is more difficult: there is quite a large
annual turnover in several countries. Vacancy levels
are often quite high, sometimes as a result of a policy
to economise on staff costs rather than because of
recruitment problems. The difficulty of appointing
sufficient treatment and health care staff is often a
result of prison service salaries being inferior to those
that such specialists could earn in the community
outside. This is another area where prison
administrations can benefit from consultation with
colleagues in other prison systems. So is staff training,
which has been recognised as in need of considerable
attention, and which has been the focus of much
technical assistance in recent years.
The constructive use of prisoners’ time
In recent years there have been many initiatives to
bring about a more constructive use of prisoners’ time,
for example by improving treatment programmes, by
enhancing the scale and nature of regime activities and
by paying special attention to preparing prisoners for
release. But there is much scope for further progress
in this area. In many prisons in parts of central and
eastern Europe there are no treatment programmes
available, there are very few organised activities of
any kind, and the staff responsible for treatment (the
case managers, educators or detachment chiefs) have
to deal with as many as 100 prisoners, whereas it is
widely accepted that 50 should be the absolute
maximum. Frequently more than half the sentenced
prisoners have no work despite the strong belief in this
part of Europe that employment is one of the most
important ways of ensuring that they leave the prison
able to cope with outside life at least as well as they
could before they came into custody. Sadly there are
also many prisons where there are no pre-release
programmes and little is done to prepare men and
women during the last weeks of their sentences.
Technical assistance is needed in connection with all
these aspects of prison life.
Health care in the prisons
As in other areas, the progress made in health care in
the prison systems of central and eastern Europe is
considerable. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done
to ensure that there are sufficient medical staff in the
prisons and, in some countries, to ensure that there are
sufficient medicines. There also need to be more
treatment programmes for those addicted to alcohol
and drugs, there needs to be more psychiatric support
and much needs to be done in respect of HIV/Aids -
to improve staff and prisoner education in respect of
the disease in order to minimise risky behaviour, to
enable voluntary screening and to ensure the
confidentiality of results, to guarantee the counselling
of HIV positive prisoners, and to counter misinformed
anxieties and reactions aroused by this disease. The
Council of Europe has arranged for health care
assessments in a number of prison systems in the region
and voluntary organisations have organised individual
projects, even including the transport of medicines
across Europe to prisons in particular need. However,
as CPT reports underline, there are still many
deficiencies and a continuing requirement for technical
assistance in a large number of aspects of prison health
care.
Conclusion
As I have indicated, technical assistance in prison
matters that are of continuing concern can valuably be
obtained from consultation with other European
countries which have found ways of dealing with similar
problems.
Another means of providing assistance is through
seminars. The Council of Europe has organised a
number of these in central and eastern Europe, focusing
on just such topics as those to which I’ve drawn
attention. Bringing in experts on particular topics can
be extremely helpful. There would be an advantage in
organising more seminars on a regional basis to provide
assistance to several countries at a time. [This is
especially appropriate and economical if the different
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countries can use a common language, as in the former
Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.]
Much bi-lateral help has also been given in prison
matters and there have also been projects organised
by international aid agencies and non-governmental
bodies such as Penal Reform International.
Assistance can also be provided through
documentation. Apart from full length assessment
reports by the Council of Europe and HEUNI, I would
particularly like to mention two publications that come
from the International Centre for Prison Studies at
King’s College, London, where I am an Associate. One
is a handbook for prison staff entitled ‘A Human Rights
Approach to Prison Management’, which aims to
present the universally agreed standards on prison
reform in the form of practical guidance for prison staff.
The other is a pack of guidance notes on prison reform
focusing on many aspects of prison management. They
aim to strike a balance between identifying general
principles and providing practical examples. Both
documents are available in several languages.
In the time allocated to me I have tried to draw
attention to some of the key areas of continuing concern
in respect of the prison systems, and to indicate that,
despite the great progress that has been made by the
prison administrations, and help that has been received,
much remains to be done. Technical assistance will
have an important contribution to make.
I will end by repeating that many of the problems
of prison systems in central and eastern Europe are
present also in prison systems in the rest of the
continent. I would stress overcrowding and the
conditions of pre-trial detention as two of the most
important. The requirement is for continuing
improvement in all the prison systems of Europe.
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Introduction
UNAFRI, like its sister regional Institutes HEUNI,
ILANUD and UNAFEI, is mandated, inter alia, to
promote the United Nations Crime Programme in
Africa. UNAFRI is a vital regional mechanism to
coordinate regional cooperation and harmonise the
provision of needed technical assistance through
tailored activities in the field of Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Systems in Africa. As the window of
United Nations Crime Prevention strategies and
framework to Africa, the Institute derives its legitimacy
for its operations from the needs of Member States in
crime prevention, particularly as crime has been noted
to be a major impediment to sustained social
development.
Areas in which technical assistance is requested
by Member States are hereafter summarized. The
basis for UNAFRI’s effective delivery of technical
assistance relates to its affiliation, collaboration and
partnership with other agencies of crime prevention
and criminal justice, including the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network
of Institutes.
The Network is a resourceful medium that has to
explore ways of harmonising the technical assistance
requested by Member States, by putting together the
means at our disposal with a view to offering to the
African region the needed technical assistance. The
continent appears more vulnerable to the devastating
impact of crime on the development of the region, given
its low technical capacities. Some parts of Africa are
very fertile ground for national and transnational
organised crime. The Centre Innocenti (UNICEF) in
this respect reveals that the majority of countries are
countries of origin, transit and destination for trafficked
women and children (UNICEF, Insight Innocenti, 2004);
and trafficking in firearms which aggravate armed
conflicts and instability in the region. This is a
consequence of the low levels of development, which
translate into lack of mechanisms for prevention and
detection of crime, giving rise to growing trends of
criminal activities with near impunity.
The paper intends to briefly describe, from the
requests by Member States (See UNAFRI’s survey,
2003; and the Programme of Action 2006 – 2007
endorsed by the Round Table for Africa (UNODC,
September 2005); the needs expressed by Member
States (Section I: UNAFRI and its Member States)
and stresses on the need for the United Nations
Programme Network of Institutes (PNI) to coordinate
the Institutes’ programmes of activities in view of
maximising the benefit by countries and regions
(Section II: UNAFRI and its Sister Institutes of PNI).
I. UNAFRI and its member states
1.1 Needs of Member States
UNAFRI‘S survey (UNAFRI and its Stakeholders,
2003) gave an insight on what was perceived as areas
of need for technical assistance by 12 Member States
(Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros,
Djibouti, Guinea Conakry, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe), which responded
to the questionnaire.
All the 12 countries have indicated their needs on:
1. Training of senior officers
2. Public awareness about UN Conventions
3. Active cooperation with neighbouring
countries
UNAFRI’S Technical Assistance to Member States:
Clusters of Actions, Prospects and Challenges
Masamba Sita, Director,
UNAFRI, Kampala, Uganda
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 Among the above countries, 11 needed:
4. Assessment in training and research
5. Innovative crime prevention initiatives
Among the same countries, 10 have expressed the need
to:
6.  Elaborating training modules
7. Disseminating relevant Conventions,
including specific UN Norms and Standards
8. Initiating African Conventions
9. Establishing networks, and
10.Dissemination of best and promising
practises
Lastly, 9 of them expressed their concern about:
11. Harmonisation of laws
1.2 Programme of Action
The expressed needs by Member States led UNAFRI
to refocus its Medium Term Strategy and Plan of Action
2002 – 2006 on a Programme of Action clustered
around (1) training, (2) sensitisation campaigns and (3)
strengthening mechanisms for subregional cooperation.
UNAFRI’s Programme of Action relates largely to the
more detailed Programme of Action of UNODC (with
7 clusters of action), endorsed by Member States (See
UNODC, 2005). The assistance UNAFRI offers to
Member States aims, inter alia, at implementing the
United Nations Crime Programme in the Member
States, taking into consideration the socio-cultural
realities of the region.
Cluster I: Training
1.1. Training of senior officers
1.2. Elaborating training modules
1.3. Assessment in training and research
1.4. Innovative crime prevention initiatives
1.5. Dissemination of best and promising
practices (an item related to all three
clusters).
Cluster II: Sensitisation campaigns
2.1. Public awareness about UN Conventions (and
standards)
Cluster III: Cooperation
3.1 Active cooperation with neighbouring countries
3.2. Dissemination of relevant Conventions
3.3. Initiating African Conventions
3.4. Establishing of networks, and
3.5. Harmonisation of laws
It is worth noting that training activities are a
means to (1) developing the capacity of the Criminal
Justice System personnel; (2) assisting Member States
internalise and implement UN Conventions and
Standards; in so doing (3) sensitising the concerned
officials and the public; and (4) strengthening
cooperation among countries, which should lead to
harmonising regional legislations.
Different UNAFRI’s activities in Member States
cover mainly three domains of action. This is to say
that, in response to the needs expressed by Member
States, the offered activity should cover the aspects of
training, sensitisation and cooperation with other
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From the above diagram, it can be noted that a
project intended for example to “Disseminate best and
promising practices” (1.5), Cluster I, leads, inter alia,
to “Public awareness about UN Conventions” and
Standards (2.1) in as far as reference is made to these
instruments, Cluster II (Sensitisation campaigns); to
“Harmonisation of laws in the region” (3.5), Cluster
III (Cooperation); to “Dissemination of relevant
Conventions” (or Standards), also in Cluster III.
UNAFRI’s technical assistance aims at a
comprehensive development of the capacity of the
Criminal Justice System personnel (sensitising the public
and strengthening cooperation among Member States).
In achieving this, it is essential that the Institute receives
support from the PNI.
II. UNAFRI and the PNI
I would like to seize this opportunity to request the
meeting to explore possibilities of backing UNAFRI
up in delivering its mandated services to Member States
for their maximum benefit in terms of technical
assistance offered, without undue duplication of effort
and resources. The Programmes of activities of
Institutes are communicated to all the Members of the
Network. This should help to avoid duplication of
activities in the regions or countries. At need, similar
or related programmes or activities in the same
countries or regions may be organised as joint activities
by concerned Sister Institutes.
Allow me to indicate that any technical assistance
by a Sister Institute in the African region or a country,
without the involvement of UNAFRI, only weakens
UNAFRI’s capacity to service the needs of its Member
States. The Network will have more to gain if it could
coordinate, when and where it would be possible, its
activities in Africa, even if this would require involving
several members of the PNI. Concerning the African
region, this will be a way of strengthening the delivery
mechanisms for technical assistance requested by
countries, and asserting the importance and relevance
of PNI. Fortunately, there is apparent reference and
identification of this realisation by the Third Committee
of the UN General Assembly as alluded in their Draft
Resolution on UNAFRI (A/c.3/60/l.10), whose
operative paragraph 8 reads:
“Call upon the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime to work closely with the Institute;”
In this respect, I wish to acknowledge with sincere
appreciation the support and collaboration received
from UNODC and hope that the established working
relationship with UNODC and other Sister Institutes
in the Network will continue to grow. Allow me to
mention that UNAFRI is indebted to United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for involving
the Institute, at different levels, e.g. Intergovernmental
Experts Group Meetings, in a number of its activities
both for the African region (Crime and Drugs as
Impediments to Security and Development in Africa:
A Programme of Action 2006 – 2010 (UNODC, 2005))
and for the world (e.g. the Criminal Justice Assessment
toolkit).
Conclusion
There is a crucial need that the “Network” operates
in a more harmonised way to maximise the use of
scarce resources at our disposal.
Our proposal in this matter is that the other
Members of the “Network” consider and explore ways
of involving UNAFRI as a partner in the activities and
drawing initiatives with specific reference and benefit
to Africa. It is possible and quite realistic for members
of the PNI to collaborate and execute or plan to
implement a number of activities in the Africa region.
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Introduction
The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
(UNAFEI) is one of the United Nations regional
institutes, established in 1961 by agreement between
the United Nations and the Government of Japan, with
the aim of promoting the sound development of criminal
justice systems and mutual cooperation in Asia and the
Pacific region.
Urbanization in Asia and the Pacific region has
been growing rapidly. UNAFEI is located in Tokyo,
but fortunately, we are located not in the centre but in
a peaceful residential area of suburban Tokyo, called
Fuchu.
UNAFEI’s activities include training courses and
seminars for personnel in crime prevention and criminal
justice administration, and the research and study of
crime prevention and the treatment of offenders. Above
all, UNAFEI has a reputation for organizing high-quality
training courses and seminars as a part of its technical
assistance. All the courses and seminars are fully
funded by the Japanese Official Development
Assistance (ODA) programme. The total number of
overseas participants that have taken part in our
programmes is 2,584 from 119 countries.
Two Technical Assistance Activities
Carried Out by UNAFEI
I would like to give you two examples of UNAFEI’s
activities:
1. The technical assistance project for the
Revitalization of the Volunteer Probation
Aides System in the Philippines; and
2. The 129th UNAFEI International Senior
Seminar.
The former one is an example of long-term technical
assistance to a specific country and the latter one is a
typical example of a multilateral training seminar.
1. Project for the Revitalization of the Volunteer
Probation Aides System in the Philippines
Background of the project:
The Philippines established a Volunteer Probation Aides
(VPAs) system in 1978. During the 1980s, the number
of VPAs exceeded 2000. However, by 2002 the
number had decreased to 167.
The Philippine Government wished to revitalize
the VPAs activities. Responding to their request, the
technical assistance project for the revitalization of the
Volunteer Probation Aides System in the Philippines
was launched in 2003.
Description of the project:
In this project, we introduced the Japanese volunteer
model to the Philippino participants. In Japan, volunteers
from the community play a key role in the prevention
of crime, especially in the field of community-based
treatment of offenders. Together with these Japanese
Volunteer Probation Officers (VPOs), UNAFEI faculty
members offered them advice on:
•  Organization of volunteers
•  Recruitment of volunteers
•  Ways to motivate volunteers, such as an
awards system
Asia and Far East Examples of Technical Assistance
in the Traditional Areas of Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice
Megumi Uryu, Professor, UNAFEI
Tokyo, Japan
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We have conducted several seminars and training
courses in the Philippines and also at UNAFEI,
including a number of Tele-Video Conference Seminars.
So far, approximately 50 Philippine probation officers
and volunteers have participated in the training sessions
held at UNAFEI.
We aim to increase the number of VPAs to 5,000
in the near future (2,000 as of Dec. 2005).
Key factors in the success of this project:
We believe that a sense of ownership in this project
was the key to its success. It is likely that several factors
contributed to this sense of ownership such as:
1. The Project was started based on the
needs of the Philippines and in response to
their request;
2.  The Project directly responded to their
needs and interests;
3. The Philippines was actively involved in
planning of the project from the outset;
4. The Project purpose and goals were
clearly shared by both the donors and the
recipients.
Consequently, the strong commitment of the
Philippines has been an important factor in the success
of the project and for its self-sustainability.
2. The 129th UNAFEI International Senior
Seminar
Secondly, I would like to tell you about our 129th
International Seminar, as an example of our multi-lateral
activities.
Background of the Seminar:
UNAFEI annually holds a five-week International
Senior Seminar for high-ranking or senior public officials
from central bureaus, departments or agencies in the
field of criminal justice, such as police, prosecution,
the judiciary, corrections and rehabilitation, etc. The
129th Seminar which was held January - February 2005
focused on the “Effective Prevention of Crime
Associated with Urbanization Based upon Community
Involvement and Prevention of Youth Crime and
Juvenile Delinquency”.
Description of the Seminar:
The seminar was composed of individual presentations
by participants, lectures by world-class visiting experts
from overseas, as well as those by Japanese experts
and UNAFEI faculty members, group workshops where
participants discussed the topic in depth, and
observation visits to relevant agencies. After
enthusiastic discussions during the group workshops,
the participants of the 129th Senior Seminar came up
with some suggestions on:
1. measures that can be taken by the police
and prosecution to prevent crime associated
with urbanization such as community policing
and community prosecution;
2. crime prevention measures in the
community by the active participation of
community residents; and
3. an integrated approach (multidisciplinary
approach) for youth at risk by the
cooperation and collaboration of multiple
agencies such as the criminal justice system,
schools, welfare services, hospitals and
others.
Suggestions
Finally, I would like to offer some suggestions in regard
to training and technical assistance in this area.
1. Encouraging a strong commitment by
high-ranking officials and the
establishment of an integrated policy
The problems of urban crime and
delinquency are often the result of various
social problems. Therefore, if we try to
provide effective assistance to the countries
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which suffer from these problems, the
establishment of an integrated policy
(approach) by the central government is
indispensable. This can be realized by the
strong political will of the leading persons
such as the prime minister, politicians and
the senior management of leading
governmental agencies, etc.
2. Promotion of a multi-agency approach
Along the same lines, multi-faceted problems
can only be solved by the establishment and
promotion of multi-agency collaboration and
cooperation.
3. Systematic training
Training of the personnel who deal with this
problem should be conducted in a systematic
way.
(a) An annual training plan needs to be
established and sufficient resources should
be allocated based upon the plan.
(b) Systematic training should consist of (i)
regular training from the primary level to
senior level and (ii) special (thematic) training
on an ad hoc basis to supplement the regular
training.
4. Systematic monitoring and feedback
system - Maintain sustainability and
further improvement of the entire system.
To realize the desired outcome of technical
assistance and training, it needs to be
carefully monitored and any problems should
be followed up by the competent
authorities.In practice, maintaining
sustainability is a very difficult issue, which
supporting countries and organizations have
been faced with for a long period, but this is
vitally important in order to realize effective
technical assistance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I strongly believe that we can work
together in the field of technical assistance. Please feel
free to let us know if there is anything we can do. Our
mission is to be able to contribute to crime prevention
and make a positive impact on society. We also need
your assistance, since UNAFEI is always looking for
experts who can contribute to our training courses
and seminars as visiting experts.
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Why standards and norms in crime
prevention and criminal justice?
Crime prevention and criminal justice deal with issues
and values that are at the core of national sovereignty.
As a result, over the centuries, criminal justice systems
have developed in diverging directions.
Three factors have changed the trend in development
from increasing divergence to closer convergence of
criminal justice systems:
•  the need to agree on common definitions
of crime and on procedural measures in order
to facilitate international legal co-operation;
•  recognition of the value of studying how
crime problems are dealt with elsewhere
(exchanging information on best practice);
and
•  the adoption of certain minimum legal
safeguards in order to promote human rights.
The United Nations standards and norms embody
an expression of a common ideal. ECOSOC has noted
that they constitute internationally accepted principles
outlining desirable practices.
Evaluation of the progress made in the
application of United Nations standards
and norms
Have the UN standards and norms had any effect in
practice? Despite the fact that they are “soft law” and
thus are not binding on the Member States (with some
exceptions), the over-all answer is “yes”, even if their
impact is not always visible.
On the international level, the UN standards and
norms have been integrated into legally binding
instruments, and cited by special rapporteurs as well
as by various UN bodies. They are also the basis for
further development of standards and norms.
Analysis of their impact on the domestic level is
more difficult, due to a number of factors: the absence
of an obligation to report, the heterogeneity of the
criminal justice systems of different States, the
possibility of different interpretations of the same text,
and the difficulty in determining if a specific change in
national law, policy or practice was due to the influence
of a United Nations standard and norm, or to other
factors.
Nonetheless, many reports from States to the UN
cite examples of the impact, and the literature shows
several further examples of impact. In many States,
the standards and norms are becoming part of the
national discourse on crime prevention and criminal
justice. Also, the standards and norms are used in
ongoing peacekeeping missions and post-conflict
reconstruction.
Promoting the implementation and
application of United Nations standards
and norms in crime prevention and
criminal justice
Standards and norms that remain sterile ideas on paper
have no true significance. The General Assembly and
ECOSOC have repeatedly called for implementation.
A variety of mechanisms can be used to promote
implementation and application:
•  reporting;
•  assessing the application of standards and
norms;
•  encouraging the appropriate UN bodies to
use the crime prevention and criminal justice
standards and norms;
Promotion of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice
Matti Joutsen, Ministry of Justice,
Helsinki, Finland
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•  providing advisory services and other
technical co-operation on request; and
•  other mechanisms.
Reporting
Reporting by Member States is voluntary. Already when
it prepares its report on domestic application of UN
standards and norms, the Member States can gain
various benefits:
•  gathering the data can lead to a
comprehensive review of the relevant
national legislation, procedures and practice;
•  by repeating the review, the States can
monitor changes in the criminal justice
system;
•  each report provides a basis for evaluating
national progress and identifying specific
benchmarks or goals;
•  the State can better understand what
problems and shortcomings have been
encountered;
•  the reporting process may also open up
government policies to wider scrutiny in
society; and
•  the reporting process may enable the State
to demonstrate that it has in fact taken
action.
Assessing the application of standards and norms
The assessment of reports can provide various benefits
to the international community:
•  the assessment can lead to a better
understanding of the various factors or
difficulties that States encounter in
application of the standards and norms, which
in turn may help the United Nations in
making better informed decisions on
technical assistance;
•  the assessment can help in identifying
ways in which the existing standards and
norms should be developed or supplemented;
and
•  the information provided may provide
further encouragement to Member States to
apply the standards and norms, and indicate
new ways in which the standards and norms
can be applied.
Providing advisory services and other technical
co-operation on request
The UNODC can promote the application of standards
and norms in a variety of ways:
•  the provision of the services of experts;
•  the organization of national and regional
seminars and other meetings;
•  the organization of other training;
•  the preparation of informational or
educational materials. The co-operation can
be directed at the legislative or policy-making
level;
•  the dissemination of the texts of the
standards and norms (this is a basic measure
and yet remains important: not even
peacekeepers are necessarily aware of
them!);
•  the dissemination of reports on application;
and
•  the development of more detailed
standards and norms.
Encouraging the appropriate UN bodies to use
the crime prevention and criminal justice standards
and norms
Promotion of the application of the UN standards and
norms should be done not only on the national level,
but also on the global level, through the appropriate
UN bodies. This includes, of course, the UNODC but
also, for example, the Centre for Human Rights (in
particular the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights), the Department for
Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, the
United Nations Children’s Fund, and the Division for
the Advancement of Women.
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The standards and norms provide other UN bodies
with material for their work, and perhaps also yardsticks
to assess progress in the field.
The work of other UN bodies strengthens the
impact of the standards and norms.
Assessment of modalities for collecting
and reporting on the application of
United Nations standards and norms
With the proliferation of standards and norms in
particular during the 1980s, concern began to be
expressed about the utility of the reporting regime.
Reference was made to, for example, the poor response
rate to UN notes verbale, the perceived poor quality of
some of the responses, and the absence of any effective
verification procedures.
A meeting of experts was convened in Vienna on
14-16 October 1991. The experts noted that, among
the major impediments to effective application, were
the resource constraints, and the fact that the cultural,
social and political realities could reflect on the way in
which the instruments or resolutions were applied.
The meeting, which took place parallel to the work on
the restructuring of the United Nations programme,
produced recommendations relating to
•  measures to improve information
dissemination and education;
•  research and technical co-operation;
•  proposed measures to make monitoring
more comprehensive,
•  to increase the accuracy and reliability of
monitoring information and
•  to make the monitoring process a
springboard for action; and
•  steps to be taken by the principal actors in
the application and monitoring of United
Nations standards.
Following on the recommendations of the meeting,
ECOSOC requested that the Secretary-General
commence without delay a process of information-
gathering to be undertaken by means of surveys and
contributions from other sources.
This model was followed, and between 1996 and
2002 a full cycle was completed.
The 1998 report of the Secretary-General contained
some proposals for further streamlining of the reporting
mechanism:
•  the concept of a model profile for individual
countries;
•  avoid requesting information from
Member States that had already been
provided;
•  bring all the available information together
into an informative whole;
•  simplify the updating of information; and
•  provide the basis for a more in-depth
analysis of relevant issues.
Discussion at the Commission on the
application of the standards and norms
The consideration of the application of United Nations
standards and norms is a standing item on the agenda
of the Commission. Equally, there has been long-
standing debate over the utility of continued work on
the application of standards and norms. Some States
note that the work required in analysing and discussing
the responses of Member States is considerable.
Among the steps taken by the Commission to
improve the efficacy of the process was to decide that
updated reports would not be made unless at least 30
additional States had replied, and that the bureau decides
which reports are to be submitted orally instead of in
writing.
The 2002 report of the Secretary-General
suggested weighing the cost-benefit value of the
resources, time and energy expended in the exercises
against the output, and considering “whether the current
system has exceeded its utility ... Discontinuation of
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the current information-gathering system would make
it possible to devote time and resources to promoting
interfaces between the body of standards and norms,
non-binding instruments, and the new binding
instruments (conventions and protocols) … Interfacing
and mutual reinforcement between the body of non-
binding and binding instruments in the field of crime
prevention and criminal justice and in other relevant
fields of United Nations competence and activity (for
example, human rights, children’s rights, women’s rights,
refugees and labour) are essential to enhance the
impact of the United Nations”
Starting the next cycle: the “cluster
approach” to assessing the application
of United Nations standards and norms
A further expert meeting was held in Stadtschlaining,
Austria on 10-12 February 2003. This meeting made
several proposals for further promotion of
implementation, including the use of the “cluster
approach” to assessment.
The reason for the “cluster approach” is that many
themes can be seen to run through the body of standards
and norms. Some instruments, or extensive elements
of some instruments, deal with such cross-cutting issues
as fair treatment, gender mainstreaming, human rights,
children’s rights, bribery and corruption, and public
security. Others deal with specific areas of concern
(for example, women, victims and juvenile justice);
criminal justice processes (for example, sanctioning,
law enforcement and prevention); sector issues (for
example, the courts and prison administration); and the
conduct of professionals (for example, prosecutors,
lawyers, police and the judiciary).
The expert group identified four clusters of standards
and norms. This approach was subsequently adopted
by the Commission:
•  first cluster: provisions related to gender
equality (in close cooperation with the
Division for the Advancement of Women).
In line with the Vienna Declaration, the focus
would be on the special needs of women as
criminal justice practitioners, victims,
prisoners and offenders.
•  second cluster: provisions related to good
governance and the integrity of criminal
justice personnel.
•  third cluster: provisions related to the rule
of law and to human rights in the
administration of justice (in close cooperation
with the Centre for Human Rights).
•  fourth cluster: provisions related to legal,
institutional and practical arrangements for
international co-operation.
Operationalization of standards and
norms in the application of technical co-
operation projects in developing
countries, countries with transition
economies and post-conflict countries
Discussions within the United Nations programme on
standards and norms should have a sharper focus. One
constant theme is that of enhancing the ability of the
programme to provide technical assistance to Member
States on request.
Experience has underlined the fundamental
importance of changes in domestic criminal justice
legislation and administration to the development of
society in general. In particular, various funding
agencies have identified corruption and deficiencies in
the rule of law as factors in the failure of a number of
projects.
Application of the standards and norms can
provide a useful tool for enhancing human rights, the
performance of the criminal justice system and the
protection of the community. Not only can they indicate
areas where more work needs to be done, they can
also provide a basis for the development of measurable
criteria of the fairness and effectiveness of the operation
of national criminal justice systems from an international
perspective.
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Although some questions regarding the application
of standards and  norms can be answered with a simple
“yes” or “no”, in many cases, adequate reflection of
the status of application would require a more nuanced
response.
For example, instead of simply asking, in
connection with the Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers, whether or not all persons have the right to
call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to
protect and establish their rights and to defend them in
all stages of criminal proceedings, the survey instrument
might ask how many practicing lawyers there are in
the country per 100,000 in population, how many
defendants in criminal cases are represented by a
lawyer, and how much funding has been allocated for
legal services to the poor.
The criteria can also be quantitative, and serve in
effect as a statistical benchmark. This is the approach
that has been used by HEUNI in assessing crime trends
and the operation of criminal justice systems in the
world. HEUNI has looked at such issues as law
enforcement resources, gender balance among criminal
justice practitioners, effectiveness of police recording,
productivity of police and prosecutors, citizens’
evaluation of police performance and citizens’
experiences of police corruption.
To take an example of possible statistical
benchmarking from the first cluster noted above, which
deals with gender equality, statistical data could be
collected on the rates of female police, prosecutors,
judges and correctional personnel per 100,000 in
population. Statistical data could also be collected on
the rate of assaults and sexual assaults against women,
based not only on official statistics but also, where
available, on victim surveys.
Several examples can be cited of the second
cluster, which deals with good governance and the
integrity of criminal justice personnel. One example
would deal with the rate of corruption among public
officials. Here, again, recorded data and victim survey
data (where available) can be used. Another example
would be the number of recorded cases in which a law
enforcement official had used a firearm, and the
proportion of recorded violent deaths which had been
connected with police activity. A third example, which
assumes the availability of victim survey data, would
be based on various evaluations that the survey
respondents have of the performance of the police.
Such evaluations are standard elements of victim
surveys.
The issue of application of United Nations
standards and norms should not be seen as one of the
convergence of national criminal justice systems toward
one standard model of criminal justice. Instead, there
will continue to be diversity. There is no perfectly
functioning criminal justice system, nor is there a unique
end-point for the development of criminal justice. Any
numerical indicators can serve only as summaries of a
detailed qualitative analysis of progress in the various
areas.
Conclusions
The United Nations standards and norms in crime
prevention and criminal justice continue to be relevant
in the development of crime prevention and criminal
justice locally, nationally and internationally. They
embody a useful and exemplary set of instruments in
international law that contribute to basic human values.
Each and every State, whether developed or developing,
should examine its progress in the implementation of
standards and norms. The standards and norms are
relevant in establishing the basis for good governance
and institution-building and thus also for economic
development especially in post-conflict situations. They
should be promoted, protected and pursued by the
Governments, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, and civil society.
The focus in the assessment of the application of
the United Nations standards and norms should move
to how these assessments can strengthen the work of
the United Nations in general, in line with over-all
priorities established by the Economic and Social
Council and the General Assembly. Particular attention
should be paid to using these assessments to strengthen
technical cooperation activities of the United Nations.
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Annex
Cross-cutting issues identified by the Secretary-
General (E/CN.15/2001/9, para. 16):
• substantive criminological issues (for
example, fair treatment, gender
mainstreaming, human rights, children’s
rights, bribery and corruption and public
security)
• specific areas of concern (for example,
women, victims and juvenile justice)
• criminal justice processes (for example,
sanctioning, law enforcement and
prevention);
• sector issues (for example, the courts and
prison administration); and
• the conduct of professionals (for example,
prosecutors, lawyers, police and the
judiciary).
Cluster 1
Provisions of standards and norms that are related
to gender equality (particularly relevant cross-cutting
issues: gender mainstreaming; women, prosecutors,
lawyers, police and the judiciary, prevention)
Model Strategies and Practical Measures on the
Elimination of Violence against Women in the Field of
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
paragraph 8(a) of the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners
paragraphs 3 and 17 of the Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
Cluster 2
Provisions of standards and norms related to good
governance and the integrity of criminal justice
personnel (particularly relevant cross-cutting issues:
fair treatment, law enforcement and the police, lawyers,
prosecutors, courts and the judiciary, bribery and
corruption, public security, prevention)
Standards and norms primarily related to
professional conduct
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
(General Assembly resolution 34/169)
Guidelines for the effective implementation of the Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Economic
and Social Council resolution 1989/61)
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
United Nations Declaration against Corruption and
Bribery in International Transactions (General
Assembly resolution 51/59, Annex)
The International Code of Conduct for Public Officials
(General Assembly resolution 51/191, Annex)
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
(Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/60)
Standards and norms primarily related to crime
prevention
Guidelines for  the prevention of urban crime (Economic
and Social Council resolution 1995/9)
United Nations Declaration on Crime and Public
Security  (General Assembly resolution 51/60, Annex)
Action to promote effective crime prevention: standards
and norms (Economic and Social Council resolution
2002/13)
Prevention and control of organized crime (Annex.
Guidelines)
Terrorist criminal activities (Annex. Measures against
international terrorism)
Cluster 3
Provisions of standards and norms related to the
rule of law and to human rights in the
administration of justice (particularly relevant cross-
cutting issues: human rights, courts, sanctioning, prison
administration, children’s rights, victims, juvenile justice)
Standards and norms primarily related to capital
punishment
Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal,
arbitrary and summary executions (Economic and
Social Council resolution 1989/65) (Annex. Principles)
Capital punishment (General Assembly resolution 2857
(XXVI)
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Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of
those facing the death penalty (Economic and Social
Council Resolution 1984/50)
Implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty
(Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/64)
Capital punishment (Economic and Social Council
resolution 1990/29)
Standards and norms primarily related to remand
and convicted persons
World social situation (Economic and Social Council
Resolution 663 (XXIV)) (Annex. Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners)
Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/47)
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
(General Assembly Resolution 45/111)
Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa
(Economic and Social Council resolution 97/36)
Standards and norms primarily related to victim
issues
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims
of Crime and Abuse of Power (General Assembly
resolution 40/34)
Implementation of the Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
(Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/57)
Victims of crime and abuse of power (Economic and
Social Council resolution 1990/22)
Protection of the human rights of victims of crime and
abuse of power (Economic and Social Council resolution
1990/22)
Standards and norms primarily related to
restorative justice and non-custodial sanctions
Basic principles on the use of restorative justice
programmes in criminal matters (Economic and Social
Council resolution 2002/12)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-
custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules) (General
Assembly resolution 45/110)
Standards and norms primarily related to juvenile
issues
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules)
(General Assembly resolution 40/33)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules)
(Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/66)
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines) (General
Assembly resolution 45/112)
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty (General Assembly resolution
45/113)
Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice
System (Economic and Social Council resolution  97/
30)
Cluster 4
Provisions of standards and norms that deal with
legal, institutional and practical arrangements for
international co-operation (particularly relevant
cross-cutting issues: law enforcement, courts)
Model Treaty on Extradition (General Assembly
resolution 45/116)
Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (General Assembly resolution 45/117)
Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in
Criminal Matters (General Assembly Resolution 45/
118)
Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners
and Recommendations on the treatment of foreign
prisoners (Annex I. Model agreement on the Transfer
of Foreign Prisoners; Annex II. Recommendations on
the treatment of foreign prisoners)
Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes that Infringe
on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of
Movable Property
Model Treaty on the Transfer of Supervision of
Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally
Released (General Assembly resolution 45/119)
Model Bilateral Treaty for the Return of Stolen or
Embezzled Vehicles (Economic and Social Council
resolution 97/29).
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Abstract
The article considers the impact of international
standards and guidelines on prisoner health in Eastern
and Central Europe and draws on some common
themes from research carried out in various European
prison systems both in adult and juvenile prisons in
the new EU member states (MacDonald, 2005, 2004,
2003). The issues discussed affect some states more
than others. However, often the same problems are
found in established EU states as in new member
states. An analysis of what the barriers to
implementation are and what future assistance is
required to improve implementation of prisoners’ right
to health care and drug treatment services will be
explored.
Introduction
Providing health and drug services that are equivalent
to those available in the community is extremely
difficult in a situation where prisoners are unable to
choose their doctor and in an environment that
demands security. In these circumstances, guidelines
and standards have a key role to play in the provision
of health care and drug treatment. However,
guidelines and standards to address prisoner health
are only useful if they are implemented and used as
the basis to change prison policies and health
services. In many of the countries that this research
focuses upon (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hunagary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia), there were examples of good practice in
the provision of health care and drug services for prisoners
but in most there was need for further work in order to
meet international standards and guidelines.
There is already in existence a wide range of
recommendations for the prison setting provided by
international bodies covering prisoners’ human rights,
health care, harm reduction and drug treatment. It is worth
noting that:
Given the diversities of cultures, political
systems and national prison policies, it is
remarkable how many nations were able to
agree on prison rules that also contain accepted
rules for medical ethics (Pont 2006).
The main guidelines for prisoner health were
established by the United Nations, the World Medical
Association, the Council of Europe and other leading
international bodies.1 The common themes that will be
discussed with particular reference to problematic drug
and/or alcohol users that are common to most of the
countries visited are overcrowding, equivalent health care,
harm reduction and drug treatment and to what extent
the provision meets international standards and guidelines.
The Impact of International Standards and Guidelines
on Prisoner Health in Eastern and Central Europe
1 United Nations (Body of Principles for the Protection of Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 1989;
European Prison Rules. Revised European Version of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Recommendation R (87) 3); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1987), World Medical Association (Declaration of Tokyo. Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment. Tokyo 1975, revised Divonee-
les-Bains 2005), Council of Europe (European Prison Rules. Revised European Version of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, Recommendation R (87) 3) and Other International Documents such as Penal Reform International:
Making Standards Work. An international handbook on good prison practice. 2nd edition, 2001; Physicians for Human
Rights: Dual Loyalty and Human Rights in Health Professionals Practice; Istanbul Protocol, The Manual on Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Dublin
Declaration on HIV and  AIDS).
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Impact of overcrowding
Prisoners in addition to being in a bad state of health
are often faced with overcrowded prisons with
substandard living conditions. Over the past years prison
populations have steadily increased while in many
countries the capacity of prison services has not kept
pace.
While overcrowding is an issue for health all over
Europe, the situation is particularly serious in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) where
overcrowding goes hand in hand with major health
problems. The majority of the ten countries identified
overcrowding as a key problem. All the prisons shared
the same problems associated with overcrowding (high
prisoner to staff ratio, decreasing opportunities for
prisoners to work and so on). However, not all of the
sample prisons were considered to be overcrowded at
the time of the visit. However, even when a prison
system doesn’t seem to be overcrowded some prisons
are – often remand prisons.
Overcrowding is an obvious cause or contributing
factor to many of the health problems in prisons coupled
with substandard prison conditions and the consequent
stressors that can negatively affect the mental health
of prisoners or exacerbate pre-existing mental health
problems.
Overcrowding hinders efforts to improve prison
living standards and prison health care services and to
preventing the spread of HIV and other infections
amongst prisoners. Overcrowding makes the
implementation of harm reduction and prevention
initiatives much more difficult and creates the conditions
for increased prison violence (including sexual coercion
and rape) and puts pressure on prison health care staff.
Prison overcrowding breaches United Nations and
other international standards and impacts on the ability
to provide equivalent care for prisoners for the following
reasons:
First, it causes a situation in which various factors
such as poor hygiene facilities and restricted living
space generally decreases prisoners’ feelings of health
and well being and puts strain on the effective delivery
of health care, harm reduction and services for
problematic drug users. In addition, staff in some of
the prisons that were visited (MacDonald 2004) felt
that, due to overcrowding and staff shortages, it could
be difficult to attend training events and made it difficult
to provide activities and drug services for prisoners.
Second, in situations where there is decreasing
public spending prison systems can be forgotten and
overcrowding can be used as an excuse for not
implementing international standards and norms.
Equivalence of health care
Human rights standards and guidelines call for
prisoners to receive health care at least equivalent to
that available in the community. “Equivalence” rather
than “equity” has been called for because a prison is a
closed institution with a custodial role that does not
always allow for the same provision of care to that
available outside. The Moscow Declaration on Prison
Health stresses that prison health care should be part
of public health (WHO Regional Office for Europe,
2003) for a range of important reasons, for example
the spread of communicable diseases due to the
movement of prisoners into prison and subsequently
back to the community that demand prevention and
treatment initiatives based on established evidence
based practice provided by public health organisations
and NGOs in the community.
In the majority of prison systems that were visited,
medical care is the responsibility of the ministry of
justice and separate from that provided in the
community. The provision of health care in the different
countries varied especially in their response to
problematic drug users and the provision of treatment,
care and prevention was often inadequate and failed
to provide equivalent services or adopt a public health
approach.
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Most of CEE prison administrations that
participated in this research claimed that prison health
care was equivalent and in some cases better than that
offered in the community. However, the recruitment
of medical staff and lack of resources were mentioned
as constant problems in the provision of health care.
There were three key issues in the delivery of
health care that come from the research that detract
from providing equivalence to that in the community:
prisoner confidentiality, dispensing and medical cover,
lack of voluntary testing.
1. Prisoner confidentiality
The first of these is prisoner confidentiality that was
not seen as a key issue in all the sample prisons. The
prison administrations are at different stages in
developing a clear understanding of the importance of
prisoner confidentiality. Confidentiality is difficult to
ensure in the prison environment and the sample prisons
achieved prisoner confidentiality to varying degrees.
While some prisons have instigated policies to increase
confidentiality, others still need to make further
improvements to meet the WHO Guidelines that state:
‘information on the health status and medical
treatment of prisoners is confidential’ and
can only be disclosed by medical staff with
the prisoner’s consent or where ‘warranted
to ensure the safety and well-being of
prisoners and staff, applying to the disclosure
the same principles as generally applied in
the community’ [WHO Guidelines 31, 32].
Many staff felt they had to know who was HIV-
positive or hepatitis positive, indicating a clear need for
further staff training about confidentiality particularly
in relation to communicable diseases.
2. Dispensing and medical cover
A second key issue was where there was not 24-hour
medical cover or medical cover during evenings and
weekends provided in prisons. This has in some prisons
led to medicines being distributed by security staff at
weekends and during the evenings. Some security staff
indicated that this could be problematic because they
are not trained in this area. This practice, along with
the difficulty in recruiting medical staff and budget
deficiencies, raises doubts about how far these prisons
provide medical services equivalent to those provided
in the wider community.
3. Lack of voluntary testing
Third is the prison health care response to
communicable diseases. HIV, hepatitis B and C are
major challenges facing prisons in Europe. Whereas
HIV testing is available in the majority of prison systems,
testing for hepatitis is very rarely available to injecting
drug users at entry to prison and this results in a lack
of prevention messages and vaccination programmes.
As prison administrations receive more prisoners
with a history of problematic drug use, the prevalence
of hepatitis C and HIV may become much higher. If
voluntary testing for HIV and HCV becomes more
accessible for prisoners this will also raise the need for
more pre- and post-test counselling for prisoners
supported by a programme of staff training.
Testing for HIV in particular was not transparent
in all the prison systems of the sample: even where
testing was voluntary, not all prisoners were made fully
aware for what they were being tested. This
demonstrates very clearly and emphasises the
importance and need for good pre-and post-test
counselling supported by a programme of staff training.
Prison systems have a moral responsibility to
prison staff and the public to prevent the spread of
infectious diseases among prisoners, and to care for
prisoners living with HIV and other infections. The
availability of HIV anti-retroviral treatments and
combination therapies have been important in improving
the health of those living with HIV and prisons present
an opportunity for prisoners (particularly injecting drug
users) to have a (voluntary) HIV test and to access
treatment if required.
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Harm reduction measures
The harm reduction and services for problematic drug
users (PDUs) that are provided for prisoners in
different countries is variable. The following four areas
will be discussed: Information, education and training;
condoms; Opioid Substitution treatment; needle
exchange all of which are specified in various
international standards (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, 2006).
In most of the countries, information, education
and training have been carried out for both prisoners
with problematic drug use and prison staff. This is often
the easiest and least controversial harm-reduction
measure for prison systems to provide. Although the
sample prisons said that they all provided harm-
reduction information to prisoners at entry to the prison,
the content of the information was often minimal and
not presented in a way that prisoners found accessible.
This was demonstrated by some prisoners in a focus
group who said that they had not received any
information on arrival at the prison despite having signed
a paper saying that they had. Often the only information
prisoners received was at reception to the prison. There
was a lack of ongoing programmes that utilised more
interactive means to provide harm reduction information
to the majority of prisoners. Some prisons provided
much more information, usually in partnership with
NGOs. Providing information in a range of languages
was also highlighted as important in order to cater for
foreign nationals or those who did not speak the native
language.
The research identified that the provision of harm-
reduction tools condoms, opioid substitution treatment,
needle exchange was inconsistent across different
types of prisons, within countries and between
countries.
Although, in theory, condoms are available in
prisons, in reality, in most of the sample prisons, they
were not accessible to prisoners. For example, condoms
may be available in the prison shop but prisoners often
have limited money so they will not buy condoms.
Studies have shown that, when prisoners have to ask
for condoms at health care services, few prisoners will
do so because they do not want to disclose that they
engage in same-sex sexual activity.
Methadone maintenance treatment is the most
researched treatment currently available for people who
are dependent on opioids. Its use is supported by an
evidence-base developed over almost 40 years and from
across many different countries. Opioid substitution
treatment was only available in two of the countries
out of the 10 countries visited but Romania is now in
the process of implementing this. Thus the availability
of opioid substitution treatment inside prison is not the
same as its availability outside prison.
Outside penal institutions, in many countries,
needle exchange or distribution programmes have
become an integral part of a pragmatic public health
response to the risk of HIV transmission among
injection drug users (and ultimately, to the general
public). Extensive studies on the effectiveness of these
programmes have been carried out. For many years,
there has been scientifically sound evidence showing
that they are an appropriate and important preventive
health measure. Generally, penal institutions have been
reluctant to implement Needle Exchange Programmes
(NEP) due to prohibitionist approaches to illicit drug
use, concerns that syringes may be used as weapons,
and that making sterile syringes available may serve to
increase illicit drug use within prisons.
The research suggests that the lack of a drug
strategy in a prison administration impacts on the
development of suitable drug treatments for prisoners.
A range of treatment options were available usually
abstinence based, but were not available in all prisons
within a country or in all of the countries. While
abstinence-based treatment programmes provide a
good opportunity for those prisoners who wish to change
their drug use, there was a lack of provision as
mentioned earlier, such as needle-exchange
programmes and substitution treatment for those who
were not motivated to stop using drugs. In addition,
where substitution treatment was available in prisons
for those who had started a programme in the
community, it was not always possible to start such
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treatment within the institution. Treatment for
problematic drug users was rarely available for pre-
trial prisoners. It is also quite rare to find examples of
drug treatment programmes that have been designed
specifically for women.
NGOs offering drug services also played a key
role in the delivery of harm reduction and treatment in
some prisons in most of the sample countries.
Short-term projects were offered in some prisons
by NGOs. After the end of the projects, all activities
that had been provided by the NGOs ceased. This
indicates a need for the national prison administrations
to make a commitment to provide assistance to enable
the ‘learning’ from such projects to continue, either by
staff training or by providing financial support to NGOs
providing such projects.
Barriers to implementation
There are numerous examples of how United Nations
criminal justice standards and norms and technical
assistance have impacted on national legislation and
led to innovative reforms (UN Information Service,
2005). However, there are many barriers that can lessen
or negate the impact from not just United Nations
standards and norms but other guidelines as well.
Overcrowding and lack of alternatives to prison
One of the key barriers to reform in the prison
environment is overcrowded prisons and a lack of
alternatives to prison that could potentially reduce
prison populations. Often there is a lack of continuous
programmes of training for new staff and to update
previous training for older staff. In situations of
overcrowding and staff shortages it can be difficult for
staff to be released for the purpose of attending training.
Prison autonomy
In many prison systems prison directors have a great
deal of autonomy as to how they allocate their budgets.
This autonomy of individual prison managers may lead
to some directors who take a leadership role and choose
to implement, for example, harm reduction and drug
treatment initiatives and others who do not. In addition
prison directors may be influenced by the concept of
abstinence that predominates amongst prison
administrations at the expense of harm reduction
measures like substitution treatment and needle
exchange as was discussed previously.
Information
There are some key documents of which there are
many excellent examples produced by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006) that are
not reaching frontline staff or not translated into the
required language of the country.
Funding for NGOs
There is a lack of sustainable funding for projects
provided by NGOs or prison administrations
themselves. In many cases, when the project is
completed, this can have a negative impact on the
implementation of key standards and guidelines.
Technical assistance
In order to overcome these barriers to the
implementation of standards and guidelines a range of
technical assistance is necessary.
1. There need to be more opportunities for
criminal justice agencies to participate in
training and projects together in order to
reach agreed protocols. This is important as
occupational cultures can be very different
in the different criminal justice agencies and
community organisations.
2. Partnership between the prison system,
NGOs, and experts from other countries with
related problems and systems is needed.
There can be a tendency for staff to say in
the CEE countries that initiatives in western
European prisons were not suitable for their
country and that there is a need for further
research in these countries to provide
evidence bases that initiatives in the west
do work in prisons in their country. Providing
funding for pilot projects is also particularly
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The lack of a coherent approach or guidelines across
criminal justice agencies is central to effective
implementation of prisoner health, drug treatment and
harm reduction. The lack of a coherent criminal justice
approach has a key impact on such things as the
implementation of substitution treatment where it is
available in the community and in prison but not in
police custody or remand houses. In addition the
documents available often refer to prisons only and
not to the wider settings of possible detention.
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More than one billion persons will be victims of crime
across the world this year.  More than three thousand
persons will be a victim of a crime every minute.  They
will suffer loss, harm and suffering at the hands of the
perpetrator and often further trauma if they cooperate
with the criminal justice system.  Their families,
witnesses and others will share this pain and loss.
Let me help you appreciate what 3000 victims a
minute looks like.  If only ten percent of those
victimizations were sexual assaults on women, it means
that at least 100 million women will be sexually assaulted
this year.  That means that every year the magnitude
of the horror of the sexual assaults that occurred in the
Rwandan genocide occurs in the world but multiplied
by 100.   Yes every year and multiplied by one hundred.
It is not just the magnitude that is the tragedy but
that it does not need to be like that.   UNODC has
been the source of important standards and norms to
prevent crime and establish principles of justice for
those victims.  WHO, DAW, Habitat have brought
together knowledge as to how reduce crime.  If
UNODC decided to champion real reductions in
victimization as its mission, it would have a winning
plan to get the resources and support to significantly
reduce one of the major blights on quality of life for
people across the world.
Prevention of victimization
In 2003, the UN adopted new standards called the
Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, renewing
guidelines from 1996.  Essentially these suggest that
governments would reduce crime significantly if they
decided to do just that and established, among others:
1. Permanent and Funded Responsibility
Centres for Prevention to maintain
institutional frameworks and structures for
effective action.
2. Multi-Sectoral Approaches and
Partnerships to tackle the multiple social
factors associated with crime and
victimization.
3. Knowledge-Driven Strategies, Human
Capacity and Data Systems to establish
effective practice and coordinate and
disseminate knowledge with appropriate
human capacity and data systems.
Unfortunately there are few countries that have
actions close to these standards to prevent crime.  Most
spend scarce resources on reacting to crime one at a
time after the fact with more police, more judges and
more prisoners.  It is countries in Scandinavia that are
among those that are closest to national strategies to
shift resources from reaction to prevention.  Canada´s
governmental National Crime Prevention Centre has
recently provided funding to our new Institute for the
Prevention of Crime at the University of Ottawa to
work with national associations and municipalities to
work out ways to harness knowledge to reduce crime
in Canada.
The International Centre for the Prevention of
Crime affiliated with the UN is a lighthouse to share
successes between countries.  But there is no
established standard to ensure crime is being reduced.
Unlike child rights, there is no international committee
on crime prevention to monitor progress in reducing
victimization.
My recent book – Less Law, More Order –  uses
the work of authoritative entities such as the World
Health Organization that have reviewed the knowledge
on what prevents victimization.  Similar to the
conclusions from the Division on the Advancement of
A Mission for UNODC to Reduce Victimization by Crime
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Women and UN Habitat, it calls for national and
international action plans that will reduce violence
significantly but without over-reliance on reactive
policing and criminal justice.  It shows what works to
reduce crime and how to deliver it.  It proposes the
type of investment and legislation that is needed to
wean government policies from an over-reliance on
reactive law enforcement and criminal justice to a
balance with cost effective and sustainable policies to
prevent crime.
Support and protection for victims
In 1985 the UN adopted the Declaration on Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power. Essentially all governments made a
commitment to provide services for victims of crime,
ensure restitution from the offender and compensation
from the state and ensure that victims are heard when
their personal interests are affected of abuse of power.
Unfortunately, it is still a minority of victims who
will be lucky enough to receive fair treatment and
support.  Even fewer will get reparation and fewer still
will be able to participate in the criminal justice process
in a manner consistent with UN norms.
The HEUNI publication on “Crime Victims:  Doing
Justice to their Support and Protection” provides
examples of what has been done to meet international
standards and provides examples.  The rights of victims
are as important as any other human rights.  Inspiring
examples exist for what is needed for developing
countries.
In Europe and other developed countries, the
needs of victims of crime and abuse of power are met
through legislation, services, and reparation.  In the
USA, services for victims of crime have been funded
from fines on offenders rather than taxes.  In France,
victims have lawyers in criminal courts.  Japan has
recently adopted a model law on how to implement the
UN declaration.   For India, the Commission for Reform
of Criminal Justice has called for an overhaul of criminal
justice to make it more responsive to victims, and to
provide rights and reparation.
Trans-nationally, the Statute of Rome in 1999 (and
later the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) established
the International Criminal Court with provisions for
victims that are closer to UN standards than any
individual piece of national legislation.  The UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
in 2000 and its optional protocol in 2002 on trafficking
includes specific sections for victims.
The recent UNODC Intergovernmental Expert
Group made a series of proposals on how to foster the
use and application of United Nations standards and
norms related primarily to victim issues.  One
recommendation is particularly important.  Member
States should be encouraged to consult the draft
convention on justice and support for victims of crime
and abuse of power prepared by the International
Victimology Institute of the University of  Tilburg in
the Netherlands and the World Society of  Victimology.
A mission for UNODC
So we have the standards and the knowledge but are
not using it.  What is needed is a UN champion to
invest to make that transformation happen.  UNODC
must become that champion and take a leaf from the
success of the UN agencies that have clear missions
and set bold targets – reduce the one billion victims of
crime by 50% within ten years.
WHO, DAW and UN Habitat are putting their
money where their mouth is.  UNODC  needs to do
the same but better than or with them by spearheading
the reduction of victimization.  UNICEF has become a
household name for its success in transformations
relating to improving the situation of children in the world
by consolidating a comprehensive convention.
UNODC must assist its commissions and
ECOSOC to develop targets and stop multiplying
conventions by adopting an overarching convention that
would provide for reduction and support for victims
while respecting the rights of offenders and the public.
50HEUNI Paper No. 28
  This would include:
· Targets for the reduction of victimization
as the central part of the UNODC strategic
plan with a concrete plan to monitor
achievements;
· A financial target of ten percent of the
resources of the Secretariat to implement
what works to reduce victimization and
enhance services for victims and to call on
Member States to do the same;
· The 2010 Congress a World Summit on
Innovation and Transformation for Less
Crime, devoting sub-themes to
- implementing integrated and
comprehensive crime prevention
- implementing services and
principles of justice for victims
- implementing evidence based
approaches to solving crime
problems.
For further information on:
· for what does and does not work and how
to implement it - Waller, Irvin 2006, Less
Law, More Order:  The Truth about
Reducing Crime, Praeger
· for support and protection of victims –
Waller, Irvin 2004, Crime Victims:  Doing
Justice to their Support and Protection,
HEUNI
· what works to reduce crime for Canada -
contact irvin.waller@uottawa.ca –
www.prevention-crime.ca
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The crime problems of Eastern Europe and the
successor states of the former Soviet Union have
diverged dramatically since the Fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Crime and
corruption in Eastern Europe, unlike in most of the
successor states of the USSR, remains a serious
problem but not a serious threat to national
development. In the Slavic states of the former USSR,
the Caucasus and Central Asia, crime is more than a
problem of crime commission. Criminals have deeply
penetrated the state, making crime a major
determinant of political, economic and social life.
The organized crime problem that many thought
would be a transitional phenomenon in post-Communist
states has proved to be more enduring. Although it is a
lesser concern in Eastern Europe than in the former
USSR, it remains a key concern for the European Union
as some Eastern European countries that have entered
the EU have high levels of organized crime and
corruption. The unresolved conflict in parts of the
former Yugoslavia remains an enormous source of
crime for much of the rest of Europe. Bosnia and parts
of its neighboring states provide key transit routes for
crime and the criminals. The Balkan route is a key
conduit of drugs, arms, and people into Western
Europe. The same route is used by Post-Soviet
criminals to transport stolen cars, pharmaceuticals and
consumer goods to the markets of the Black Sea region
and the former USSR.
The problem of crime remains intractable in most
of the Soviet successor states and is still severe in the
Baltics. The crime groups from the post-Soviet states
have globalized and have established working
relationships with crime groups in Western Europe,
North and South America and Asia. Therefore, much
international cooperation is needed to address this
phenomenon and coordination among governments and
law enforcement bodies is limited.
Aggravating the problem is the absence of political
will in most Soviet successor states to address crime
and corruption. This is consequence of pay offs by
crime groups to officials in both the state structures
and both national and regional legislatures. In some of
the most criminogenic regions, crime groups have
penetrated the police or are elected to political office.
Furthermore, oligarchs who are key actors in many
national economies often have close ties to organized
crime who defend their financial investments in
transport, heavy industry and the energy sector.
In contrast to the countries of Eastern Europe,
where democratic governments are functioning, most
of the Soviet successor states have more authoritarian
governments with a lack of accountability and
transparency. Without checks on government, there is
little capacity for these states to counter the pervasive
organized crime and corruption. The curbs on media
and civil society in most Soviet successor states limit
the checks on corruption and organized crime.
Divergence of the post-socialist
countries
Since the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there
has been an enormous divergence in the countries of
the former socialist bloc. This divergence has occurred
in the political arena, economic policy and in the social
welfare of these countries.
No greater contrast can be found than that
between an Eastern European country such as Poland
whose standard of living is approximately half of that
The Divergent Organized Crime of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Successor States
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of the long standing members of the European Union
members with that of Tajikistan where citizens earn as
little as $20 a month. The long term Civil War in
Tajikistan has left many youthful citizens illiterate and
one-third of households are forced to send members
abroad into difficult work conditions to provide for basic
family needs. In contrast, educational levels in the recent
accession states of the EU are high and many
universities are rapidly rebuilding international links and
re-establishing high educational standards.
Enormous differences exist between the
professionalism of the security and the police in post-
socialist countries. Polish border guards, trained by EU
trainers, seek to limit smuggling across their borders
whereas the ill-equipped Tajik border patrol is incapable
of stopping the severe drug flows that cross its borders
from Afghanistan. In the deteriorating border posts on
its frontiers, adequate food supplies are constantly in
question. The guards are no match for the criminals
who use satellite phones to move their valuable cargo
without detection1.
The same contrast is seen in the quality of policing.
Enormous efforts have been made by the EU to provide
training for the police in accession countries. In contrast,
many police in Soviet successor states receive low
wages that are already an inducement for corruption.
The preconditions facilitating corruption are aggravated
by the enormous wealth of some crime groups that
see payments to the police as just a cost of business.
In some parts of Russia, the police have literally merged
with the criminal organizations. Prizewinning research
conducted among the police and criminals in Kazan
revealed that the major criminal organization divided
its activities among those who served within the police
and those who functioned outside (Salagaev 2007). This
problem is most acute in regions where the criminals
have the greatest political and economic influence.
Political divergence
Most of the countries of Eastern Europe have made
dramatic transitions from the socialist era, jettisoning
their formerly corrupt authoritarian political systems,
instituting multi-party systems and fair competitive
elections.
There are several important reasons for the
political divergence. The countries of Eastern Europe
and the Baltic states were not part of the socialist
system for as long as the twelve other Soviet successor
states. Many of the countries of Eastern Europe
resisted Soviet rule and the norms of the socialist system
were never as fully integrated into these countries.
Eastern European countries aspiring to join the affluent
and democratic European Union were motivated to
change. Moreover, these countries faced fewer
obstacles to adapt to the norms of the European Union
as there was less of a legacy of Soviet rule. Moreover,
many welcomed foreign assistance in developing
accountable legal institutions and improving standards
and ethics for law enforcement and judicial personnel.
In contrast, many of the Soviet successor states
have not only failed to democratize but their current
governments are more authoritarian than the USSR at
the close of the Soviet period. This problem is
particularly acute in Central Asia but this situtation is
not confined to these countries as there is an absence
of free and competitive elections, free media and
independent judiciary in almost all the Soviet successor
states2.
Unlike in Eastern Europe, a new leadership
distinct from the Soviet period did not emerge in most
Soviet successor states. Dissidents and political
opponents of the Soviet era, did not assume leadership
positions in the post-Soviet states. Nor did émigrés
return to take key positions as occurred in the Baltic
states. Most people who presently rule in Soviet
successor states emerged from the Party, komsomol
 1 Visit by the author to Tajik border in September 2006.
 2 See Freedom House reports, www.freedomhouse.org , accessed May 21, 2007.
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or security apparati of the Soviet era. The corrupt and
criminalized elites remained in power in most of Soviet
successor states, in contrast with the first accession
countries admitted to the EU from Eastern Europe.
Crime groups in parts of Russia, Ukraine, the
Caucasian and Central Asian states assume key roles
in law enforcement, legislatures and even in local and
regional governments3. In contrast, the president of
Lithuania was ousted before the country’s admission
to the European Union because of his ties to Russian
organized crime4.
Most of Eastern Europe, with the exception of
the former Yugoslavia, have been spared the violent
political conflicts that have affected so many of the
Soviet successor states including Moldova
(Transdniestria conflict), all of the Caucasian countries
(Nagorno-Karabagh, Abkhazia and Ossetia),
Chechenya in Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
(Ferghana region). Conflict regions were often left with
criminalized ruling warlords assuming political power.
These conflicts have caused an increase in crime and
corruption as has been noted in other regions of the
world. In many cases the grievance has been maintained
by the crime group which profits from the continuation
of the conflict. These unresolved conflicts have proved
highly criminogenic. Therefore, the phenomenon that
has been identified elsewhere in the world where the
greed of the participants in the conflicts may be more
relevant than the initial grievance also pertains to many
Soviet successor states (Berdal &  Malone 2000).
Transdniestria remains an epicenter of human
smuggling, serious drug flows cross Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan and the conflict regions of the Caucasus
remain important centers of smuggling not only of
consumer goods but also of arms and drugs5 (Cornell
& Swanstrom 2006; Kukhianidzem et.al. 2007).
Economic divergence
During the socialist period, most citizens in Eastern
Europe and the USSR lived at a basic level of existence.
Although Communist Party elites enjoyed significant
privileges and higher standards of living, in general
neither their homes nor overall standard of living could
be defined as lavish. The social and economic status
of the citizens of the former socialist world have
diverged significantly. In the recent accession states
of Eastern Europe and the Baltics, there is the re-
emergence of a noticeable middle class. Even though
there are some individuals who have become rich in
the transitional period, there are not the enormously
wealthy oligarchs of Russia, Ukraine or the rich clans
of the political elite of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In
most of the Soviet successor states, members of the
party and komsomol elite of the Soviet era appropriated
enormous natural and industrial wealth for themselves
through the privatization process. This is the rare case
where the survivors of a failing political system were
able to secure their political power after the political
collapse through the appropriation of huge economic
resources by illegal or semi-illegal means.
Organized crime groups have been major
beneficiaries of state privatizations in many states of
the former Soviet Union acquiring control of real estate,
markets, and even important industrial sectors such as
the Uralmash crime group in Russia (Handelman  2005)
(Varese 2005). Organized crime operates on a notable
scale in all of the former socialist countries of Eastern
Europe. Yet only in parts of the former Yugoslavia such
as in Bosnia or Kosovo do crime groups assume such
a central role in political and economic life as they do
in the Soviet successor states (Montanaro-Janovski
2005).
3 The  arrest of the mayor of Vladivostok who was a member of a criminal gang is evidence of this. He was elected to office even
though the citizens knew he was a criminal. See www.crime.vl.ru, accessed May 21, 2007 for a discussion of the situation.
4 “Lithuania Replaces Impeached President”, www.rferl.org/featurearticle/2004/5/E&AA4158-CB15-45A4-9FF2-
70C8B08BDC31.html, , accessed May 21, 2007.
5 See Frontline video Sex Slaves, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/slaves/,  accessed May 21, 2007.
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There is an enormous economic disparity among
the former socialist states. Many countries in Eastern
Europe have improving social indicators and Estonia
has recently enjoyed an annual growth rate of about
10 percent. In contrast to this, some successor states
have seen rapid declines in their standard of living and
have experienced significant economic decline since
the collapse of the USSR. The countries of Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have experienced the most
acute decline. The social indicators of Tajikistan are
now on the level of some of the poorest countries of
Africa.
Throughout the former Soviet Union, corruption
is a major impediment to economic investment.
Indicators of corruption developed by Transparency
International and the Davos World Economic Forum
reveal that the countries of the former Soviet Union
are among the most corrupt in the world whereas those
of Eastern Europe have levels of corruption that are
significantly lower6.Under these circumstances,
legitimate foreign investment is rare and many of the
oligarchs choose to invest their capital overseas rather
than within their own countries7.
Divergent crime problems
Research conducted on rates of victimization and other
comparative indices of crime reveal that high rates of
violence remains a continuing problem in the Soviet
successor states, particularly Russia which has among
the highest homicide rates in the world (Andrienko,
Shelley 2005; Pridemore 2001). In contrast, in many
of the Eastern European countries, crime rates do not
diverge significantly from the countries of Western
Europe8.
Many new forms of crime have appeared since
the collapse of the socialist system. The collapse of
the social welfare protections of the Soviet era, the
disappearance of strict border controls and the decline
of authoritarian police controls have resulted in crimes
not previously known or not known on a large scale.
The most notable of these are human trafficking,
smuggling, as well as large scale drug trafficking of
heroin and synthetic drugs.
The World Bank now estimates that Eastern
Europe and the former USSR is the third largest region
for migration in the world. Much of this migration is
illegal, Russia is estimated to have 10 million illegal
migrants out of population of 140 million (Tiuriukanova
2007). Ukraine also notes a significant illegal migrant
population not only from the Soviet successor states
but also from China (Popson 2007).
Initially, human trafficking was almost always for
the purposes of sexual exploitation. Victims were
transported primarily outside of the former socialist
countries to markets in western Europe, Asia and as
far as North and South America. An exception,
however, existed in the war torn Balkans where women
were imported from Russia, Moldova and Ukraine to
satisfy the demand created by peacekeepers
(Mendelson 2005).
Human trafficking for labor exploitation now
eclipses sexual trafficking in terms of the numbers of
people involved. Extensive labor trafficking exists in
the more affluent Slavic countries of the former USSR
that draw migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus
as well as from China, India, and Vietnam. Workers
from the Baltic countries find themselves as trafficked
laborers in western Europe9.
6 See Jan van Dijk, “Mafia Markers:Measuring Organized Crime and Its Impact on Societies,” forthcoming in Trends in
Organized Crime.
7 Note the large number of Russian investors in London real estate markets as well as the investment of Abramovich in the
sports team Chelsea.
8 International Crime Victimization Survey, 1989-2000, www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/038003.xml, accessed
May 21, 2007.
9 See research of Anna Markina for International Organization for Migration in Estonia, www.iom,int,/jahia/page 829.html,
interview with scholar May 8, 2007.
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In the receiving countries of the former USSR,
migrants are often victims of ordinary and hate crime
by local populations. In contrast to the illegal migration
observed in western Europe, illegal migrants are not
vectors of crime and are consequently not
disproportionally represented in prisons. Despite the
fact that migrants are more often victims rather than
perpetrators of crime, the migrants are not assimilated
and there is a rise of anti-immigrant feeling in Russia
and to a lesser extent in Ukraine. Kazakhstan, in
contrast, is trying to find ways to regularize this
migration.
Recent years have seen an enormous growth in
drug problems along trafficking routes from Afghanistan
to Western Europe. The drug route out of Afghanistan
has changed significantly in the last 5 years. Once
Afghan drugs were moved overwhelmingly along a
Southern route that included Iran. Now a significant
share of the increased drug crop traverses Slavic and
Caucasian states. The movement of drugs is aided by
poor border controls and corruption. The imbalance
between the significant resources available to the
criminals and the limited resources available to the
states helps explain the proliferation of the more
northerly drug route.
The absence of prevention and treatment
programs in non-EU states compounds the growth of
the crime problem. Addiction grows among
disadvantaged but also among the children of the
affluent middle class and elite who consume both
synthetic and poppy based drugs (Shelley & Cornell
2006). At present in Russia, there are 6 million addicts
out of a total population of 140 million. This is a greater
proportion of abusers than in the U.S. that is considered
to have the largest demand for illicit drugs. This
phenomenal growth in abuse has occurred within a
short period of time.
Conclusions
Organized crime remains a serious and enduring
problem for the Soviet successor states. It is more than
a crime problem but is a key determinant of the political,
economic and social development of most Soviet
successor states. In contrast, many of the countries of
Eastern Europe, particularly those who have joined the
European Union have made much more of a
commitment to combat organized crime.
The Soviet system collapsed. Often the states of
the USSR have limited contacts but the globalized
criminals have exploited the decline of borders and state
capacity to address their illegal activity. With their
international ties, educated and violent personnel, there
is little prospect that their crime is a transitional
phenomenon. Their criminal activities will be a major
determinant of the development of their home countries
and will have international consequences. There is little
prospect for a significant change in this phenomenon
in the near future.
The countries of Eastern Europe still face serious
problems of organized crime. This will remain an
important challenge for the European Union in the
coming decades. But with political will, a sustained
commitment to address this problem and significant
resources, it may be possible to reduce the
pervasiveness and influence of Eastern European
organized crime.
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A Practitioner’s Commentary
Erkki Hämäläinen, Detective Chief Superintendent,
NBI, Vantaa, Finland
Effective prevention and tackling of organised crime
requires effective implementation of the strategies. The
implementation of the strategies and in particular the
concrete instruments derived from the strategies, are
vital in the assessment of their impact. So far the
European Union has adopted numerous instruments in
order to strengthen the implementation of the strategies
and in order to facilitate the cross-border operative law
enforcement co-operation between the Member States.
How effectively do these top-down instruments
affect the practical law enforcement co-operation at
the practical level? The question is twofold: first how
well are the EU strategies giving answers to the
problems and difficulties confronted in the field and
second how well the top-down approach fits in the law
enforcement practices and objectives of the
practitioners - law enforcement authorities doing the
practical field work.
The starting point will be the objectives of EU
article 29 (EU treaty) which want to provide citizens
with a high level of safety within an area of freedom,
security and justice by developing common action
among the Member States in the fields of police and
judicial co-operation in criminal matters.
That objective shall be achieved by preventing
and combating crime through a closer cooperation
between police forces, customs authorities and other
competent authorities in the Member States, both
directly and through the Europol and with a closer
cooperation between judicial and other competent
authorities of the Member States including cooperation
through  Eurojust.
In order to achieve this objective the EU ministers have
adopted several instruments, among others:
• European Police Office (Europol) +
Europol Information System (EIS)
• European Judicial Cooperation Unit
(Eurojust)
• The European Agency for the Management
of Operational Co-operation at the External
Borders (FRONTEX)
• The European Police Chiefs Task Force
(EPCTF)
• European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
• The Schengen Agreement + Schengen
Information System (SIS)
• etc.
In addition, several common actions are adopted at the
Council level with the aim to strengthen the co-operation
among the Member States on areas such as:
• The Europol Organised Crime Threat
Assessment on (OCTA), including the
Council Conclusions based on OCTA;
• COSPOL - projects:
• The Framework decision on Joint
Investigation Teams (JIT), 2002;
• The Framework decision on European
Arrest Warrant (EAW), 2002;
• EU Convention on Mutual Assistance
(MLA 2000);
• etc.
There have been, in the third pillar frames, the
mutual evaluation concept assessing how well certain
areas of the third pillar instruments have been
Organised Crime and its Prevention in Europe
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implemented and what best practices could be
identified. The mutual evaluations have been very
supportive instruments in order to compare the level
how well the Member States have adopted the
instruments in question. However, the mutual evaluation
system has not necessarily  had the view which would
benefit the field law enforcement worker.
This practitioner’s commentary, therefore, gives
some critical views and assessments how the Europol
and the concept of the Joint Investigation Teams (JIT)
might contribute to the law enforcement co-operation
at the field level in tackling organised crime.
The basic question at the practitioner’s level is
how these instruments have supported their everyday
work when fighting organised crime? How effectively
do the EU instruments affect the law enforcement co-
operation at the practical level? How well are the EU
strategies giving answers to the problems and
difficulties confronted in the field? How well could the
EU - instruments contribute to the common or joint
actions of the law enforcement authorities accross the
Member States?
There seem to be numerous questions where there
are still no correct or comprehensive answers. Maybe
there should be more empirical studies in order to get
more information about the practical level
implementation of the instruments and also to get more
information about the impacts of the instruments.
Just to give more detailed examples about the
influence to the practical level law enforcement co-
operation by the EU instruments I would like to refer
to the Europol and the concept of the Joint Investigative
Teams. Both initiatives seems to be very operatively
oriented and by that way very supportive to the
operative work at the Member States level.
In Europol there are liaison officers (LO) seconded by
the Member States. The LOs seconded to Europol are
representatives of their national law enforcement
agencies. As to the LOs Europol can give also other
relevant support such as:
• Facilities (meeting rooms, interpreters, IT-
support, etc.);
• Operational analysis in support of
operations;
• Threat assessments and crime analysis;
• Expertise and technical support for
investigations and operations carried out
within the EU and
• The Europol Computer System (TECS: an
information system (IS), an analysis system,
an index system).
Europol can also participate in JITs (since 03/2007)
and is allowed to ask the Member States to conduct
and co-ordinate investigations in specific cases.
Practical experience in Finland has shown that
the potential of the Member States LOs in Europol are
most widely used among all of the Europol services by
the national law enforcement agencies. The facilitating
services, such as the meeting rooms, interpreters, IT-
support, etc., as well as the analytical support for the
operations, seem also to be used quite well.
The real role of Europol concerning the JITs is
still developing.
On the whole, the potential of the present Europol
seems to be still inadequately used by the Member
States.
Then, if assessing other operative instruments such
as the Joint Investigative Teams, the picture seems to
be totally different. The information received from the
LOs of the Member States in March 2007 shows that
the total number of JITs implemented by the Member
States was about 20, which seems to be a very low
number (from 2002 when the concept of the JITs was
adopted in EU).
The statistics show that there have been JITs between:
•  France - Spain 9 (6 terrorism)
•  Finland - Sweden 2
•  The majority of JITs in Members States
are single cases
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•  The majority of Member States have had
no formal JITs at all.
The joint or parallel investigations, if not formalized
as JIT, are not included in the statistic.
The basic question is why the situation with the JITs is
like the statistics indicate. There seem to be several
reasons for that:
• The Framework Decision on JIT has been
operational only since 1.1.2003 -  delays in
national implementation;
• Differences in national implementation -
sometimes the implementation of the EU-
instrument seems to be more limited at
national level (e.g. information exchange);
• The EU priorities/instruments are not
known to the law enforcement authorities
of the Member States;
• The national interests are put in first place
before the EU-priorities - wider common
EU-interests are not on the front line of the
everyday thinking  of the law enforcement
authorities, and
• The poor information flow from Member
States to Europol’s analysis databases, AWF,
and COSPOL - projects.
There could also be practical reasons such as:
•  The formal procedure setting up the JIT
is supposed to be too heavy and time
consuming;
• JITs are supposed to be far too expensive
- uncertainty on who bears the costs;
•  Uncertainty on how the evidences
collected could be used in another state;
•  Cultural differences and insufficient
language skills;
•  Hindrances caused by the differences of
national laws, and
•  Lack of mutual trust - the role and interests
of all participants are not known.
There could be also other means for the law
enforcement authorities to solve the practical problem
which seem to be more attractive or more practical in
the individual case to be used instead of the EU
instruments, e.g. parallel investigations.
The use of the common EU instruments, in order to
contribute more effectively to the practical law
enforcement work, should support more effectively the
exchange of the experiences and good practices already
applied in the other countries’ JIT -concept. It should
also be assessed if  joint instruments could be developed,
such as:
•  Model JIT-agreements;
•  Agreement on the management of the JIT
(e.g. team leader/s);
•   Agreement on the intelligence gathering
and the role of Europol/AWF in it;
•   Agreement on how costs should be divided
and
•  Agreement on the role of  Europol support.
Also a handbook/guide should be prepared for
practical issues; training for the leaders and members
of the team should be provided and also the knowledge
should be delivered, needed  to benefit from EU funding
possibilities (ref. Commission Funding Programme:
Prevention of and Fight against Crime 2007-2013).
It is quite obvious that the project based, result
oriented, intelligence led, multidisciplinary law
enforcement co-operation will be and should be the
future way for EU law enforcement in combating
serious and organised crime. Europol and JITs, when
implemented in practice, have a great potential to
gradually bring up the culture and the way of actions
of the law enforcement societies in EU Member States
towards a more effective, comprehensive and
European minded combat of organised crime.
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Tom Vander Beken, Professor
Ghent University, Belgium
Introduction
Organised crime is a key concern within the European
Union (EU) and the explicit justification for many
actions taken and special services being set up and
staffed. The phenomenon—or rather, the construction
of it—also has a great influence at the legislative level.
Indeed, a link with organised crime opens the door to
special legislation in which a number of safeguards can
be set aside. The underlying principle is that organised
crime necessitates a harder and more drastic response
from the government so that exceptions to the normal
procedural rules are acceptable and even necessary.
The EU advocates a knowledge based policy
making process founded on an intelligence cycle in
which policy decisions are based on facts and sound
analysis. In the EU, this knowledge based policy making
on organised crime is vested on the existence of EU
organised crime assessments.
In 2006, the European Union introduced a new
instrument to report on organised crime: the European
Union’s Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).
This instrument was expected to mark a new approach
to the way in which Europol, the European institutions
and the Member States would think and operate in the
future and is considered an important step into a change
of paradigm in policing towards a more pro-active and
forward looking approach to fight organised crime.
(Europol, 2006)
This paper analyses to what extent the first OCTA
meets these expectations and can be considered as a
useful and reliable tool for policymakers. The paper
focuses on the knowledge base for policy making and
what is or can be known about this by the general
public. It explicitly takes the “outsider’s view” to test
the methodological base, the quality and the relevance
of the information of the first OCTA. Information and
sources that are not accessible to the public are
therefore not used.
Background
In November 1993, the European Council decided that
an annual strategic report on organised crime was to
be issued. The aim of this report would be to provide
insight into the organised crime phenomenon within the
European Union. In November 1994, the Council
accepted the production of this Organised Crime
Situation Report (OCSR) to be dependent upon the
exchange and analysis of information by the member
states. It was therefore agreed to set up a common
mechanism for the systematic collection and analysis
of information. This mechanism was used for the 1994
and 1995 EU situation reports. In 1997, the basic
methodology was further developed (ENFOPOL 35) and
the new methodology was applied for the first time in
the 1997 report. In the meantime, the European Council
in Dublin – 13 and 14 December 1996 – underlined its
absolute determination to fight organised crime and
stressed the need for a coherent and coordinated
approach by the European Union. It decided to create
a High Level Group on Organised Crime tasked with
drawing up a comprehensive Action Plan containing
specific recommendations, including realistic timetables.
The work of the High Level Group resulted in the Action
Plan of 28 April 1997 to Combat Organised Crime.
This Action Plan set up a Multidisciplinary Group
(MDG) on organised crime which was intended
especially to comprise judicial authorities and police
representatives and to stimulate an integrated approach
The European Organised Crime Threat Assessment:
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to combat organised crime.1 A Contact and Support
Network (CSN) was established to examine the issue
of measuring organised crime. Tasked with the further
development of the methodology and involved in
producing the annual EU Organised Crime Situation
Report, the purpose of the network was to ensure the
quality of the reporting process and of the report’s
content. In February 1999 – under the German
Presidency – discussion resumed on improving the
methodology. A document was produced, proposing
three steps towards further development of the
European OCSR. These steps, which were intended
to provide a long-term perspective, were the following:2
· a generally recognised data collection
mechanism and a uniform collection of
certain basic data in all member states
(which would contribute to the harmonisation
and standardisation of the reports);
· the collection of qualitative data/material
to furnish a more exact and detailed
description of organised crime;
· the use of a threat assessment methodology
describing the conditions that foster crime,
as well as the causes of organised crime.
This document did not initially give rise to specific
action on the issues proposed. In 1999 and 2000,
however, the Swedish delegation announced the
intention of Europol and the MDG to change the
structure and composition of the OCSR. According to
the Swedes, the focus of the report should shift from
the description of current and past situations to
assessment of threats and risks related to future
developments in crime and their implications for law
enforcement within the EU. Sweden therefore proposed
that the organised crime situation report should be an
annual strategic report produced for the purpose of
planning, within the EU and the member states, by the
Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) and Europol. The
aim of the Swedish proposal was to make the purpose
of the report clearer to its users so that it would facilitate
the collection of national contributions and provide a
better foundation for the formulation of conclusions in
the overall EU report, which would result in better and
clearer recommendations.3 Based on the Swedish
proposal, Europol examined its OCSR and decided to
re-orient the report to a threat assessment based on
OCSR and emerging phenomena. According to Europol,
an overview of this kind would be complementary to
those produced by the Member States. If the Member
State report became more threat or future oriented,
Europol stated, the two mechanisms would support each
other to produce an even better overview of the situation
in the EU, and the result would be a vital document for
prioritisation, planning and common action within the
EU. According to Europol, the current OCSR went
beyond the mandate areas of Europol and therefore
raised problems in assessing data quality because
perceived OC priorities by the Member States and
Europol might vary.
On March 13, 2001 the Commission services and
Europol issued a Joint Report entitled ‘Towards a
European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime’4
which proposed the development of an information
collection plan reflecting a knowledge-management
process from a multidisciplinary perspective. In line
with the prior Swedish proposal, the Joint Report
proposed that explanatory annual reports should be
compiled, rather than the traditional descriptive
documents. Later in 2001, and on the basis of the
Swedish proposal, the CSN discussed a possible
change to the structure of the EU OCSR and
recommended to the Multidisciplinary Group that the
OCSR should be converted into an annual strategic
report. Such a strategic report would be used for
planning purposes, and it would focus on assessment
of relevant threats and risks as well as on
recommendations related to combating and preventing
organised crime. As a consequence of the shift to a
more future-oriented report, it was recommended that
the name of the OCSR should be changed. Given that
1 Council of the European Union, 6204/2/97, ENFOPOL 35, Brussels, 21 April 1997
2 Council of the European Union, 8469/99, CRIMORG 55, Brussels, 19 May 1999
3 Council of the European Union, 14942/00, CRIMORG 173/ CATS 72, Brussels, 22 December 2000
4 Council of the European Union, 7825/01, CRIMORG 34, Brussels, 20 March 2001.
62HEUNI Paper No. 28
the report took a three-year perspective, had annexes
describing new trends and tendencies, and put forward
stronger recommendations to its recipients, it could no
longer be called a ‘situation’ report. Consequently, it
would simply be called the Organised Crime Report,
OCR: in short, the OCSR should become more threat,
trend, assessment, and future oriented; it should use
appendices so that it became a timely product, and it
should become more ‘customer’ oriented by allowing
the Heads of the National Units (HENUs), the PCTF
and other decision-makers to have their say in its overall
structure and orientation.
In the autumn of 2001, the Belgian Presidency
proposed an action plan to convert the OCSR into an
annual strategic report for planning purposes with the
primary focus on assessment of relevant threats and
risks, as well as on recommendations related to
combating and preventing organised crime (CRIMORG
133).5 The basis was to be a conceptual model,
discussed in formal and informal CSN meetings and
proposed by the Belgian Presidency, which comprised
analysis of traditional and non-traditional elements:
environment analysis, organised crime group analysis,
analysis of counter measures developed by criminal
organisations, as well as scans of the legal and illegal
markets. Attached to this action plan was a first
inventory of the existing approaches and methodological
tools, as well as a time schedule for the plan (starting
with the organised crime groups). The aim of the action
plan was to determine and schedule the various
measures required to study all the identified aspects of
organised crime. It dealt with the preparation of the
OCR and the gradual integration of methodological
improvements area by area. As a general rule, the new
methodological approach would be adopted in the
following stages: identification of sources by consensus,
consideration of a threat and risk assessment model,
agreement on a general model, agreement on carrying
out analysis of the topic identified, production of a first
revised report, feedback from customers on the first
report, revision, evaluation and recommendations for
future development (Verpoest & Vander Beken 2005).
The second multi-annual programme, the Hague
Programme,6 has built upon the progress and
experience of the former 5 years and reaffirms the
importance of an area of freedom, security and justice
as a high priority on the EU-agenda. This programme
states that Europol must replace the crime situation
reports by yearly threat assessments on serious forms
of organised crime, which will be used by the Council
to establish yearly strategic priorities. These, in turn,
will serve as guidelines for further action and will be
the next step towards the goal of setting up and
implementing a methodology for intelligence-led law
enforcement at EU level. The Hague Programme
explicitly calls for a forward looking approach to fight
organised crime in a more pro-active than in a re-active
manner.
In order to efficiently execute the Hague
Programme, the Commission identified 10 priorities on
which it felt efforts should be concentrated, one of them
being the ‘developing of a strategic concept on tackling
organised crime’.7 On 2 June 2005, a more specific
communication about ‘developing a strategic concept
on tackling organised crime’ was made,8 pleading
for the development of a European Criminal Intelligence
Model (ECIM) of which an European OC threat
assessment (OCTA) by Europol should be the key
element.
5 Council of the European Union, 14959/1/01, CRIMORG 133, Brussels,10 December 2001.
6 Council of the European Union, 16054/04, The Hague Programme for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the
European Union, 13 December 2004.
7 Communication from the  Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Hague Programme: 10 priorities for
the next five years. The partnership for European renewal in the field of freedom, security and justice, OJC  236, 24 September
2005.
8 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2005)232 final,
 Developing a strategic concept on tackling organised crime, 2 June 2005; Council of the European Union, 9778/2/05, Council
and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the
European Union, 10 June 2005.
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On 3 October 2005, the Council concluded that
from 1 January 2006 onwards, Europol was to produce
an Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) in
place of its annual Organised Crime Situation Reports,9
in order to support the further development of a common
intelligence model, by Europol and the Member States.
In 2006, the first OCTA was presented10 and
policy conclusions drafted by the Council of the
European Union.11
What is it (for)?
The OCTA has the clear ambition to be used in an
intelligence cycle to feed the European decision making
processes in the fight against organised crime. The
OCTA does not aim to provide figures and numbers of
criminal groups, but qualitative and forward looking
statements (knowledge) about the challenges this
phenomenon poses: “Whereas the OCR was primarily
focusing on the description of the OC situation in
Europe, the OCTA puts an emphasis on the
qualitative assessment of this complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon. The OCTA, being a forward-
looking document, will help decision-makers
identify strategic priority areas in the fight against
serious and organised crime and to initiate an
intelligence process to define operational targets.”
(Europol 2006, 4)
The OCTA explicitly claims to be a threat
assessment. Although many definitions and ideas about
the definition of “threat” exist and are used, it does fit
in a larger conceptual risk assessment framework.
Risk can be broadly defined as the chance of something
happening that will have an impact on objectives. It is
measured in terms of likelihood and consequences
(Black et al. 2001 – see also Di Nicola 2006). However,
risk as a working concept is defined depending on the
agency and its requirements. For some agencies, risk
definitions coalesce around the likelihood and impact
of loss, injury, disadvantage or destruction or exposure
to hazard or danger. For others, in more neutral mode,
risk definitions focus on the chance of something –
positive and/or negative – happening that will have an
impact on objectives. Those agencies tasked with the
responsibility of public and national security (i.e., those
that act in a protective capacity) generally rely on the
negative aspect of impact, and thus the likelihood of
events or actions is often the defining variable (Vander
Beken 2004: 483). Organised crime threat assessments
are thus assessments that measure the likelihood of
criminal activity. Their main focus is on the intent and
capability of the criminal actors involved, not on the
consequences (impact, harm) this might cause (impact
assessments). It is also possible, apart from threat and/
or impact, to study the vulnerability of the (legal)
environment of (organised) crime and assess to what
extent capable and willing offenders (threat) have the
opportunity to commit their acts and cause harm to
society (impact). Given the profit driven nature of
organised crime, vulnerability studies in organised crime
assessments could address the vulnerability of
economic sectors (e.g. transport, waste disposal, see
Vander Beken 2005a).
A closer look at the content and ambitions of the
OCTA shows that it is of a very hybrid nature. On the
one hand it seems a threat assessment when it tries to
make statements about organised crime groups and
criminal markets. On the other hand, it carries elements
of an impact assessment since the evaluation of the
level of threat is sometimes directly connected to its
impact on society. Moreover, the analysis of key
facilitating factors (like the misuse of the road
transport sector) contains elements of a vulnerability
study.
9 Council of the European Union, 10180/4/05, Council conclusions on intelligence-led policing and the development of ht
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), 3 October 2005.
10 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006, public version.
11 Council of the European Union, 10181/06, CRIMORG 94, Brussels, 6 June 2006.
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Is it reliable?
There is very little public information and transparency
about the methodology used for the OCTA. Even for
scientific purposes, Europol and the Council seem to
be reluctant to disclose anything about “the making of”
the OCTA report (See Klerks 2007, 101). This makes
it hard to evaluate the reliability of the assessment.
But it certainly is not very reassuring to the public to
find out that there seem to be secrets about the
methodological foundation of the report (van Duyne
2007, 127).
We do, however, know a lot about how the former
organised crime reports were made and related
problems. It has been described earlier that the Europol
report, in these times not “owned” by Europol as the
OCTA now, heavily relies on contributions made by
the Member States. We know that, notwithstanding
many efforts and discussions, the quality and reliability
of these Member States data differ to a large extent
(van Duyne 2007). There is data of different nature,
taken from different databases, resulting from different
approaches (qualitative and quantitative). Moreover,
this data is sometimes (politically) filtered at Member
State level and brought together in a “European” report
subject to (political) negotiation acceptable to all
Member States (Vander Beken et al. 2005). This has
been described as an annual ritual dance with lots of
smoke and shady procedures to decide on the “truth”
about organised crime (Vander Beken 2005b).
It is also known that the OCTA claims to have a
new methodology but that this methodology is
considered far from perfect. Reference is made to the
need for clearer indication of the sources, the evaluation
of information originating from these sources and the
way the conclusions are drawn (Council Conclusions
2006, see footnote 11). Further, we are sure that the
OCTA, although an “owned” Europol document now,
still heavily relies on information provided by the
Member States and is still “negotiated” with them.
Many of these Member States are not likely to be ready
to deliver information about threats (Vander Beken et
al. 2005)). In any case, there are no signs that Member
States are fundamentally changing their own reporting
system because of OCTA. On the contrary, new types
of organizations (e.g. the harm oriented Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in the UK –
Harfield 2006) and organised crime (threat) assessments
emerge in Member States (Dutch National Threat
Assessment – Klerks 2006, German BKA-reports –
von Lampe 2004).
As an outsider, we do (and may) not know how
exactly the OCTA is made. We know, however, that
the conditions in which Europol has to draft the OCTA
are not favorable to obtain good and reliable results.
Is it meaningful and interesting?
According to the OCTA, the main threatening aspects
of organised groups are, “first, the overwhelming
obstacles in dismantling them because of their
international dimension or influence, and second,
their level of infiltration in society and economy”
(Europol 2006, 5).
In that context, four main categories of groups
have been identified: (1) Principally territoriality based,
indigenous OC groups but with extensive transnational
activities; (2) ethnically homogeneous groups with their
leadership and main assets abroad; (3) dynamic
networks of perpetrators whose fluid organisational
setup make them less susceptible to conventional
investigative techniques; and (4) outlaw motorcycle
gangs and other groups based on strictly defined
organisational principles without an ethnic component.
With a view to and in targeting the above groups,
the following criminal markets should attract focused
attention on the common EU level: drug trafficking,
especially synthetic drugs, exploitation of trafficking in
human beings and illegal immigration, fraud, Euro
counterfeiting, commodity counterfeiting and intellectual
property theft and money laundering.
Furthermore, OCTA highlights the following
regional patterns: (1) South West Europe, in particular
with regard to illegal immigration, cocaine and cannabis
trafficking for further distribution in the EU; (2) South
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East Europe, specifically with regard to heroin
trafficking, illegal immigration and trafficking in human
beings, aimed at the whole of the EU; (3) North East
Europe with regard to highly taxed products aimed at
the Nordic countries and beyond; (4) Particular
transportation hubs, such as harbors and airports
pertaining to the Atlantic region, used for the movement
of various commodities to and from the EU, in particular
drugs.
As an outsider, these conclusions make it hard to
find out what the real threats are. It seems as if Europe
is threatened by all kinds of (mostly non-indigenous)
criminal groups, committing many types of profit driven
crimes, regionally spread across Europe. As such,
OCTA does not look like a sharp priority setting tool.
With some creativity, such conclusions may justify
nearly any policy decision.
Readers with some background in organised
crime research (see e.g. Fijnaut & Paoli 2005) will
probably not be very surprised by the OCTA
conclusions. Many of the trends and threats described
have been reported elsewhere before (van Duyne 2007,
124).
Positive is that, for the first time, a European
organised crime assessment report contains elements
of ranking and explicit statements of levels of threat
(highest threat, most threatening). This is what is
expected from a priority setting tool.
OCTA and policy making
In June 2006, the Council of the European Union took
conclusions, setting the EU priorities for the fight
against organised crime (see footnote 11). These
priorities are the following:
· in South West Europe, attention should
be paid to the impact of African OC
groups in the field of trafficking of human
beings, smuggling of illegal immigrants
as well as drug trafficking, thereby
promoting co-operation between, initially,
French and Spanish law enforcement
authorities. African OC groups should be
focused upon and their involvement in
cannabis smuggling and further
distribution into the EU.
· the focus in South East Europe should
be on ethnic Albanian OC and its
involvement both in heroin trafficking and
distribution and in trafficking in human
beings. This would promote co-operation
initially between Italy, Slovenia and
Greece and partners in the Balkan region.
· priorities in North East Europe should
be focused on OC groups, including
Russian speaking OC groups, primarily
involved in commodity smuggling,
promoting co-operation in the Baltic Sea
region activities in the Atlantic region
should be focused on the production of
synthetic drugs by OC groups based in
Belgium and the Netherlands and their
ensuing distribution within the European
Union and via Germany and the UK
across the Atlantic into the US and
Canada. This would promote co-
operation between these countries and
across the Atlantic.
· the fight against money laundering and
illicit arms trafficking should be included
in all of these priorities.
These priorities strongly relate to the OCTA
conclusions. The relationship between policy making
and the analytical report is strong. But, as mentioned
above, the OCTA conclusions are so general in nature
that they allow for nearly “any” kind of policy in regard
to organised crime. The policy consequences of the
adoption of the OCTA conclusions are therefore limited.
Many different policy decisions remain open and no
doors are closed.
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Conclusions
The European Organised Crime Threat Assessment is
an ambitious project in the framework of knowledge
based policy making. In this paper the nature, quality
and content of the OCTA 2006 have been discussed
from an outsider’s perspective, based on open source
material.
Although the method behind the OCTA is not
disclosed, problems related to the collection, reliability
and compatibility of data have been identified. From
its content, OCTA does not look like a specific threat
assessment report, though it includes specific elements
of this kind (e.g. ranking and some priority setting,
discussions about capabilities of criminal groups). The
conclusions of this first OCTA report are very general
and diverse in nature and may support a variety of
policy decisions.
These flaws related to method, quality of data,
conceptual clarity and relevance do not allow to call
OCTA the corner stone of a criminal intelligence model
within the EU yet. But there is no way back. European
citizens have the right to be informed about the
(knowledge) base of what their policy makers do and
decide in the fight against organised crime. From that
perspective, there is a distinct need for more, but also
for better “OCTA”.
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